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Summary vii
Summary
Electricity is the cornerstone of modern society, but electricity policy is rarely debated in the
public. Some energy projects, such as new transmission grid or wind-farms, may reach the top
of the media agenda and be publicly debated. But for the most part, changes in the electricity
sector is implemented without greater debate in public. This thesis is a case study of
participation in the policy-making process in one energy project, Statnett's application to
construct interconnectors to Germany and Great Britain. The aim of the thesis is to explain the
level of participation in and media coverage of the policy process. Two analytical approaches
has been utilized. Firstly, the “quiet politics” framework developed by Culpepper which
focuses on the qualities of the issue itself and issue salience as explanatory factors for
participation and media coverage. Secondly, the “punctuated equilibrium” framework
developed by Baumgartner and Jones which emphasizes the organization of the policy field
and the definition of outsider-groups as explanatory factors. The thesis is based on the
following empirical material: official documents, reports and legislation, as well as an
argumentation analysis of the public consultation and quantitative analysis of the media
coverage of three different energy issues. 
The main findings are that there has been few participants in the public consultation and very
little media coverage of the interconnectors. Participation in the public consultation has been
limited to actors and organizations already involved in electricity policy. Both of the
analytical frameworks provides valuable insights to explain why there has been few
participants. The issue is technical and complex which makes it difficult to understand and
represents a barrier to both participation and media coverage. On the other side, the policy
field is dominated by powerful actors who sets the agenda, defines the alternatives and
provides the information. This makes it difficult for outsider groups to participate. In addition,
these two explanatory factors may work together, in that the technical and complex nature of
the issue supports and strengthens the position of the dominant actors and facilitates a policy
process that is difficult to access for outside actors. 
viii Summary
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Introduction 1
1 Introduction
Electricity has during the past century become one of the most critical part of modern society.
The secure and stable provision of electricity is important for industries, households, and the
general functioning of society. Norway as a country is privileged with its abundance of natural
and renewables energy resources. Considering how important electricity is in society, one
could expect ample public debate about how to ensure and develop the electricity sector.
However, there is in general little public debate on the direction of Norwegian electricity
system policy. From time to time some energy issues emerges on top of the political agenda,
but these are mainly protests over single energy projects such as gas power, wind-farms,
hydroelectric power plants, and electricity grids. However, the debate over these energy issues
only rarely challenge or debate the general direction of electricity policy. 
One project that is currently evaluated by the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE) is
Statnett's application for new interconnectors to Germany and Great Britain. Interconnectors
denotes a specific type of electricity grids, namely the transmission grid that crosses national
borders. The purpose of interconnectors is to facilitate trade in electricity across borders. With
the interconnectors, the Norwegian electricity system will be more closely connected to the
German and British electricity markets. The price difference between Norway, Germany and
Great Britain will determine how much electricity is exported or imported. There is a
consensus that the electricity price will increase as a result of the interconnectors, the
disagreement concerns itself with how much (see i.e. Statnett 2013a; Taule et al. 2012). 
Investments in electricity grid influences the ability to provide electricity and at what prices
the electricity is provided and as such it is of a general concern that the electricity grid is
expanded in a rational manner. Furthermore, the life-span of electricity grids is upwards to 60
years which warrants that decisions are taken on the best possible grounds (NOU 2012:108).
Concerning the interconnectors planned by Statnett, they have to a very little extent been
debated in the national media and I wonder how this influence participation in the decision-
making process. My research question is as follows:
What may explain the level of participation in and media coverage of the policy
process up to the political decision of granting or denying Statnett a license to trade in
electricity with Germany and Great Britain?
I will answer this research question by analyzing the case based on two different theories.
Culpepper (2011) argues that the importance voters place on an issue, or issue salience,
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influences who participates in policy making as well as the outcome. With low salience issues
there are few incentives for both journalists and politicians to engage in the issues because
media coverage would not increase newspaper sales and it does not pay off electorally. When
issues are characterized by low salience, the policy development is left to the policy
subsystem and influence is gained through what Culpepper calls quiet politics. Quiet politics
refers to a policy dynamic where expert knowledge and lobbying efforts is central to
achieving political goals. Culpepper theorizes that one reason issues are not salient is that they
are technical or complex, thereby creating an information asymmetry between insider and
outsider groups resulting in a policy field dominated by experts. In sum, issue salience
influences who participates in the decision-making process. This is further exacerbated if the
low salience issue also is a technical and complex issue. 
The other theory is that of punctuated equilibrium, developed by Baumgartner and Jones
(1993). According to this theory, policy development is dominated by stable and strong policy
monopolies. As long as the policy image and membership in the policy monopoly is stable,
policy making will be characterized by incrementalism, or small changes over time. When an
issue is placed on the agenda or an external shock places the issue on the agenda, new actors
and new institutional venues are involved, changes to policies may occur. According to
Baumgartner and Jones, the existence of strong and stable policy monopolies will effectively
dampen agenda-setting activities, limit participation in policy making and media coverage of
the pertaining issues.
Based on these two theories, I have two sub-research questions:
1. To what degree is the technical nature and the complexity of the issue an explanatory 
factor in determining participation and media coverage, through low salience?
2. To what degree is the policy process dominated by a powerful policy monopoly,
thereby limiting participation of outsider-groups and limiting media coverage?
1.1 A brief description of the case
In Norway there are several ways in which the public, interested parties and organized
interests can influence public policy making. The main channel of influence is through the
elections, whereby the population elects its representatives to the Parliament (Østerrud
2002:139). Between the periodic elections the media channel is one of the most important
channel for influencing policy making. This is achieved, most notably, by the agenda-setting
abilities of the media. Research has shown that the media's agenda becomes the readers'
agenda, an effect known as the agenda-setting effect (Jenssen & Aalberg 2007:256; McCombs
& Shaw 1972). This agenda-setting effect is also valid in a negative sense, in that the media
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does decide on which issues are covered, and by extension, which issues are excluded (Aardal
et al. 2004:397). According to Christensen et al. (2010:136) a bias in media coverage is that
media attention is easily drawn towards negative sides of the public management as well as
policy areas with conflict, be it single cases or general sides of a policy area. 
The last channel of influencing public policy making is through what is commonly referred to
as the corporate channel. In the corporate channel, organized interests and collective actors
are invited into the policy making process by the bureaucracy, through for instance
participation in committees and public working groups. Representation and involvement is
usually based on either one of two criteria: the organization represent members who are
particularly affected by the policy area, or the organization or individual may represent
particular expertise within an area which makes their input valuable to the bureaucracy
(Christensen et al. 2010:128). Corporatism in the Norwegian context is commonly used to
denote organized interests' influence and participation in official policy development and
implementation through routine contact with the bureaucracy. This routine contact with the
bureaucracy is supplemented with lobbying efforts towards the political leadership in
Ministries, the Parliament and parliamentary committees. Lobbying is usually defined as
informal contact between elected representatives and interest organizations, businesses, and
individuals (Christensen et al. 2010; Rommetvedt 2011). 
1.1.1 Overview: electricity policy
Electricity policy is a conjuncture of many different policies. One policy is the 'Green
certificates' which was implemented in 2012. The purpose of the 'Green certificates' was to
subsidize and provide incentives to construct new renewables electricity generation. The aim
of the policy is to construct 26.4 TWh in Norway and Sweden by 2020 (NOU 2012:39). With
the increased capacity, a new challenge is created which is that this electricity has to be
consumed as electricity cannot be stored. If this new capacity is introduced to the electricity
market without expanding the demand for electricity, there will be a reduction in the
electricity prices. A reduction in price will lead to increased consumption (Helm 2012:102).
Increased electricity consumption connects the green certificates with another policy, namely
the energy efficiency policies adopted to reduce the energy intensity of the economy as well
as policies adopted to increase the energy efficiency in all sectors (see i.e. Meld. St. 21 2012). 
If the green certificates policy is implemented properly and the goal is achieved, there is an
expected surplus of electricity. There are, simplified, two ways of off-setting this surplus. One
way is to export the electricity for which the proposed interconnectors to Germany and Great
Britain is instrumental. The proponents of the interconnectors argue that increased export is
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necessary to ensure value creation in the electricity sector. Furthermore, they argue that a
possible climate effect is achieved if renewables substitutes coal- and gas-fired thermal plants
in Germany and Great Britain. This will lead to reduced emissions of climate gasses (Agder
Energi 2013; BKK, 2013; EnergiNorge 2013; Statkraft AS, 2013). The other solution to off-
setting the surplus of electricity is to increase consumption of electricity. The opponents of the
interconnectors argue that low electricity prices is a comparative advantage for the energy
intensive industries and the petroleum sector (IndustriEL AS, 2013; Industri Energi, 2013). 
The government's position towards interconnectors is unclear. In the government green-paper
on the construction of electricity grid the issue of interconnectors is debated. It is noted that
the interconnectors are important to ensure the security of supply and that they shall be
constructed to the degree that they are socioeconomic profitable (Meld. St. 14 2011-2012:52).
However, they do not state whether there is a political aim to construct more interconnectors,
or how the issue of increased supply of electricity from the green certificates should be
tackled. On the grounds of this ambivalent governmental position Statnett has decided that
they shall facilitate for increased electricity export to the continent, and currently Statnett has
applied for concessions to construct two interconnectors, one to Germany (NordLink) and one
to Great Britain (NSN) (MPE 2013b). 
As mentioned above, Statnett has applied for licenses to construct two interconnectors, and
the application was sent on a public consultation from May 23rd to August 23rd. By the
deadline, a total of 14 interested parties had responded to the public consultation. Out of these
14, there was comments from one grid utility, two electricity producers, two trade unions, five
business organizations, three civil society organizations, and one individual (MPE 2013b). On
October 13th 2014 Statnett was granted the necessary licenses to construct the interconnectors
(MPE, 2014). 
1.2 Delimitations
To be able to get a reasonably sized project for this master thesis I have delimitated this thesis
to Statnett's application for an international trading license for the interconnectors to Germany
and Great Britain. In addition to the application for international trading licenses, Statnett
needs construction licenses for the two projects. The public consultation for the construction
license was conducted by the Norwegian Water Resource and Energy Directorate (NVE), and
as this only concerns itself with the practical solutions chosen, I have chosen to not include
this in the thesis. 
The other delimitation I have made concerns itself with the responses to the public
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consultation. There were 14 responses out of which one response was from a single
individual. I have defined this individual out of the thesis, as the individual does not represent
any interests or a larger entity. For the rest of this thesis I will not concern myself with this
response to the public consultation, and refer to the remaining 13 responses. 
1.3 Outline of the Thesis
In addition to this introductory chapter, where I have presented the research question as well
as outlined the case, the thesis consists of seven other chapters. In the second chapter I will
present the analytical framework. Here I will present the theories in detail as well as derive
expectations to the case. In the third chapter I will present the methodological considerations
made. Here I will present the methodological consideration in the use of both argumentation
analysis as well as the media analysis. In addition I will elaborate on the validity and
reliability of the thesis. The fourth chapter will provide the reader with background
knowledge pertaining to this study, amongst other an introduction to the Norwegian electricity
system. 
The fifth chapter concerns itself with the empirical evidence on the electricity sector. This
includes a historical presentation of interconnectors, Statnett's application as well as empirical
evidence on the structure of the electricity sector. In the sixth chapter I will present the public
consultation, as well as the result of the argumentation analysis on the responses. This chapter
also includes the results of the media analysis. In the chapter that follows I will analyze and
discuss the empirical findings based on the analytical framework. Here I will firstly analyze
and discuss the two sub-research questions separately, before I analyze and discuss the main
research questions, and hence the two theories up against each other. In the last chapter I will
provide some concluding remarks. 
6 Analytical framework
2 Analytical framework
Agenda setting is considered the first stage in the public policy-making cycle, and the analysis
concerns itself with how, if at all, problems emerge on the government’s agenda (Howlett et
al. 2009:92). Issues that are on top of the government's agenda are usually under scrutiny by
the media. Media attention creates awareness amongst groups and policy makers not directly
involved in the policy field. One goal for interest groups and other parties will be to put their
issue on the government's agenda, or avoid such a move by others. Issues may emerge on the
agenda by different measures, for instance some issues appear regularly or by routine such as
periodic elections, budgetary cycles, and scheduled policy evaluations. Other issues are put on
the agenda by means of an external shock, i.e. safety in the petroleum industry after the oil
spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 (Birkland 2011:180; Howlett et al. 2009:104). 
In the case of granting or denying Statnett licenses for interconnectors, the Government has
the power to decide. This entails that the interconnectors are put on the Government's agenda,
however, as I will show in chapter 5 this emergence has been followed by limited media
coverage and limited public debate. This chapter presents the analytical framework, starting
with Culpepper's theory of 'quiet politics' which mainly focuses on issue salience as an
explanatory factor in determining media coverage and participation. After that I will present
Baumgartner and Jones' theory of punctuated equilibrium which attribute little media
coverage and few participants in the policy-making process to the existence of policy
monopolies. 
2.1 The importance of salience
The amount of attention devoted to any given issue by media and politicians is not a constant.
Some issues receives abundant attention, and others are barely covered at all. Culpepper
argues that the difference in attention depends on whether or not it is a politically salient
issue. Issue salience refers to how important the average voter considers the issue, relative to
other issues (Culpepper 2011:4). Issue salience is, according to Culpepper, detrimental in
determining the policy dynamics of a given issue and how much power a given policy
subsystem has over the outcome. Policy subsystems can be understood as the actors, interest
organizations, industries, bureaucracy and politicians involved in the same policy field
(Howlett et al. 2009:81). 
Political parties will profile themselves on issues of high political salience, and the media will
cover them extensively. This entails that both the politicians and journalists develop
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knowledge of the issues, and has access to independent expertise, thus enabling them to
challenge the expertise of a policy subsystem (Culpepper 2011:5). Issues of low political
salience, on the other hand, are not important to the voters thus giving few incentives to both
journalists and politicians to develop their own expertise. Hence, neither the journalists nor
politicians have the necessary expertise to challenge the experts of the policy subsystem
(Culpepper 2011:9). 
2.1.1 Rule-based decision-making and quiet politics
The mode of decision-making may influence the actors involved and the interests represented.
In low salient issues, decision-making is often delegated to the bureaucracy and the decision-
making is characterized by being rule-based. Rule-based policy areas may be policy areas that
historically have been dominated by government action, or policy areas where strict
regulation is needed to make sure there is proper competition in the market (Culpepper 2011).
Electricity policy is a rule-based policy area, where much of the decision-making is delegated
to the bureaucracy, and this may be attributed both to historical developments and a policy
area where strict regulation is needed. The electricity sector has been developed in tandem
with the industrialization of Norway, with a strong degree of public ownership (Skjold &
Thue 2007). The electricity sector is also one of the sectors where strict regulation is needed
to ensure proper competition. This is mainly because electricity grids is a natural monopoly,
where competition does not improve service delivery (Reiten, 2014:23). As such there is a
need to ensure that the dominant market position is not misused by the grid utilities. This
entails, for instance, strict regulation of the grid utilities including amongst other a
requirement that all projects to upgrade or invest in new electricity grids has to be approved
by NVE or the government (Energilovforskriften 2012). However, Statnett and other grid
utilities still have a lot of autonomy within the bounds set by government.
Whereas high salience issues are characterized by partisan competition, low salience issues
are to a lesser extent decided by partisanship and to a greater degree decided by and delegated
to the bureaucracy. Bureaucratic decision-making is characterized by an appreciation of
expertise. The bureaucracy often involve both interest- and business-organizations in their
work, and the inclusion is often based on what these organizations offer in added value, which
is often expert knowledge (Culpepper 2011:183). Inclusion in policy-making entails
participation in expert groups, forums, and working groups by interest organizations,
businesses, researchers and other experts. The purpose is to supplement the knowledge of the
bureaucracy with that of experts or confer with those directly affected by the policy area
(Christensen et al. 2010:128). The inclusion of interest- and business-organizations in public
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policy-making often results in policy networks being established around the bureaucracy
(Culpepper 2011:182). 
'Quiet politics' is the term used by Culpepper to describe this policy dynamic, when policy
making takes place away from the spotlight of the media. The term coins the expertise utilized
by the bureaucracy as well as the lobbying efforts directed at the political leadership in the
Ministries, Government and Parliament (Culpepper 2011:4). One of the most important
factors in the successfulness of 'quiet politics' is the deference that media and politicians place
on expert knowledge. Because issues of low salience gives few incentives for media and
politicians to get involved, they do not have knowledge or access to independent expertise to
challenge the expertise in the policy subsystem (Culpepper 2011:9).
This thesis investigates participation in the public consultation and media coverage of the
interconnectors. Public consultations are as its name states, public, and open to any who feels
inclined to send a response. In the public consultation there are no formal rules that limit
participation, however, it does not entail that everybody participates. Low salient issues are
characterized by limited participation, and policy development is left to the policy subsystem. 
2.1.2 Salience, politicization and participation
According to Culpepper, and as elaborated on above, issue salience determines who are
involved in policy making through its effect on media attention and electoral payoffs.
However, what determines issue salience? Culpepper theorizes around why some issues are
more salient than others. One factor identified is that low salient issues also are technical and
complex. Technical and complex issues heightens the barrier to participate and challenge the
experts. Furthermore, when issues are technical and complex, it will be difficult for the
politicians and the media to convince the voters of the importance of the topic (Culpepper
2011:8). 
An operationalization of what constitutes technical or complex issues is not provided by
Culpepper, which leads me to employ other measures to describe the issue. The dictionary
defines technical as: “(1) relating to a particular subject, art, or craft, or its techniques. ▪
requiring special knowledge to be understood […] (2) involving or concerned with applied
and industrial sciences” (Concise Oxford English Dictionary 2011:1479). This definition of
technical encompasses some aspects worth a note. Firstly that technical refers to a particular
subject or field that often is related to the applied or industrial sciences, and secondly that
common knowledge is not sufficient to gain an understanding of 'technical' issues. In the
following I will understand 'technical' as a description of abilities or knowledge within the
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applied or industrial sciences that has to be learnt or studied. Complex is defined as:
“Consisting of parts or elements not simply co-ordinated, but some of them involved in
various degrees of subordination; complicated involved, intricate; not easily analyzed or
disentangled” (The Oxford English Dictionary 1989:613). This definition also encompasses
several elements that is worth commenting on. Firstly, that a complex issue consists of several
parts or elements that relate to each other to constitute a whole, and secondly that it is not
necessarily easy to disentangle how these parts are interrelated. This definition entails that one
has to understand both the parts and how they are interrelated to understand and make up an
educated opinion of the issue. 
I will argue that the issue of interconnectors is a technical and complex issue. It requires a
technical understanding of the electricity infrastructure and a basic understanding of the
electricity system. In addition it is also necessary with an understanding of how different
electricity systems interact, how trade is organized and social economics, to understand what
considerations has been made. With the above-mentioned knowledge, it is possible to make a
qualified judgement as to whether the interconnectors are both necessary and worth the costs. 
For politicians and journalists it is costly to develop expertise in complex and technical issues,
and low public concern reduces the incentive to do so. This may lead to public inattention
towards the issue which creates an asymmetry in the information the 'experts' has compared to
politicians and journalists. The inattention entails that issues may be framed in the media and
experts exercising a disproportionate influence on public policy. Disproportionate influence is
mainly gained through the deference enjoyed by experts, lack of independent experts, and
politicians afraid of challenging the experts (Culpepper 2011:178). 
Low salience issues are thus characterized by mainly being left over to the bureaucracy, where
experts in the policy subsystem have a lot of influence. However, by means of politicization
some issues may emerge on the agenda either temporary or permanent. Culpepper argues that
issues moving from low to high salience is a rare occurrence, however some issues may be
politicized and for a short period of time be on top of the media and politicians agenda.
Politicization can be defined as “an increase in polarization of opinions, interests or values
and the extent to which they are publicly advanced towards the process of policy formulation
[...]” (De Wilde 2011:556–67). When an issue is politicized, it is put on top of the media's
and Government's agenda. This move involves previously uninvolved actors, most notably the
politicians and the media but also the public as well as previously uninvolved industry actors
and interest organizations. Politicization of issues might occur as swiftly as they are
depoliticized again, and when an issue only gains temporary high salience, the debates may be
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dominated by the experts (Culpepper 2011).
2.1.3 Summary
To sum up, issues varies in the political salience the average voter places on them, and the
salience has effects on both the media coverage, how attentive the politicians are and who
participates. The casual relationships is illustrated in the diagram below, where the arrows
indicate causal directionality and the mathematical symbols indicate whether the effect is
positive or negative. In the model I have chosen to merge the variables media coverage and
salience, mainly because I will not be able to independently measure salience. Furthermore, I
have left out the voters of the model as they are not conceptualized as an independent variable
in Culpepper's model, rather their preferences are conceptualized in the notion of salience.
The model shows that if issues are of a technical and complex nature, this will be an
independent barrier to participation. The technical and complex nature of an issue does also
have a negative influence salience and media coverage, however, media coverage and salience
is in itself a positive influence on participation. It is important to note that this is a
simplification and illustration of the theory and should not be interpreted as a strict casual
model. 
In the introduction I posed the following sub-research question: “To what degree is the
technical nature and the complexity of the issue an explanatory factor in determining
participation and media coverage, through low salience?” According to Culpepper's theory, if
the issue of interconnectors is technical and complex, it will also be a low salience issue. Low
salience issues are characterized by low participation, and participation is then limited to
those actors who are already involved in electricity policy or in other words, the policy
subsystem. This will also be reflected in the media coverage, in that there will be little
coverage, and the media coverage is dominated by the experts already involved in the policy
field. 
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2.2 Policy monopolies and punctuated equilibrium
Baumgartner and Jones (1993) has developed the theory of punctuated equilibrium based on a
critique of theories that view policy development and policy change as a linear process. The
theory has been developed to conceptualize a holistic model where the periods of stability
and abrupt change is explained. In the periods characterized by stability, policy development
is dominated by policy monopolies, with clearly defined in- and out-groups. From time to
time this stability is disrupted and the issue is put on the political agenda. When an issue is put
on the agenda, the policy process opens up, thereby increasing participation and alternative
understandings of the policies. It is during these periods of instability that there is a window
of opportunity for radical change in the policies as new participants and other interests are
represented in the decision-making process (Baumgartner & Jones 1993:4)
There are clear differences in how Baumgartner and Jones conceptualize participation and
policy change compared to Culpepper (2011). Culpepper argues that issues are qualitatively
different from each other, some easily understood, other complex and technical in nature.
Some issues have a direct effect on the inhabitants, such as taxes or welfare spending, than
others. These factors influence how much attention the voters devote to the issue as well as its
importance to the voters, and through that the media and politicians involvement with the
issue. According to Baumgartner and Jones (1993), there are no qualitative differences in
issues, however there are policy subsystems with differing abilities to establish a monopoly,
thereby limiting participation and agenda-setting efforts by outsider-groups. 
The notion of policy change is also conceptualized differently. Baumgartner and Jones
theorizes that policy monopolies manage to control the policy development and limit
participation, leading to incremental changes in policies when an issue is not placed on the
political agenda. Radical changes in policy may occur when issues are set on the political
agenda, and the changes occur because new actors are involved in the policy process,
representing different interests and thereby evaluating the policy differently. Hence change
occurs when the policy monopolies loose their grasp of the policy (Baumgartner & Jones
1993). This can be contrasted to Culpepper (2011) who argues that change may occur all the
time, however the issue salience influences participation in the decision-making process. With
low salience issues the decision-making power is delegated to the bureaucracy and there is
little partisan competition and little media coverage thereby limiting the public awareness of
the issue. 
12 Analytical framework
2.2.1 Policy monopolies, images and incremental change
Baumgartner and Jones advocate a theory where the notion of policy monopolies is a central
concept in understanding participation and policy change. According to Baumgartner and
Jones (1993:7) policy monopolies has two characteristics, namely “a definable institutional
structure […] responsible for policymaking” which limits access to the policy-making process
and a powerful policy image supporting the institutional structure. Policy image is understood
as a way in which a policy is understood and discussed (Baumgartner & Jones 1993:25).
Baumgartner and Jones (1993:7) continues to argue that once this 'institutional structure' has
been accepted as achieving some sort of public policy goal, the initiatives will be supported
and fostered by the Government. This leads me to understand the notion of policy monopoly
as a more or less closed version of policy subsystems, where both participation is limited as
well as certain notions of how policy alternatives are viewed and which policies are deemed
appropriate. 
Baumgartner and Jones (1993) provides a rather fuzzy definition of policy monopolies, and
less information on how this definition may be operationalized. Hence I will rely on the
framework developed by Boasson (2011) to operationalize the concept of policy monopolies.
Boasson argues that the ability of an actor to shape policy outcomes is dependent on their
structural position in society, which includes both the organization of government and private
actors and the relations between these (Boasson 2011:20). Boasson focuses on the distribution
of authority and information in her operationalization of policy subsystems.
The distribution of authority is important as it is a determining factor as to who participates
and who dominates when decisions are made (Boasson 2011:20). Usually the Government has
a superior position when it comes to authority, as it often encompasses the roles of making
rules, being a referee, and enforcing the legislation (Scott 2008:53). The distribution of both
information and authority is not even, and controlling information may be crucial in the
process of influencing policies. No organization will be able to fully control all relevant
information, however, the organizations with issue-specific information will “have a favorable
position in the policy development process” (Schattschneider 1960:136). According to
Boasson (2011:22) the distribution of authority and information should be weighted equally,
and the distribution of both will determine which actors are influential in the policy-making
process. 
In electricity system policy, there is an established authority in MPE and NVE. Together,
these determines the rules and regulations that apply to Statnett. However, this distribution of
authority is only one part of the operationalization of policy monopolies. As will be shown in
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the empirical evidence, Statnett is a centrally placed actor with access to information about
the electricity system. As owners of the transmission grid Statnett has information about the
flow of electricity in Norway, as well as the flow of electricity between Norway and
neighboring countries. This information is crucial when developing plans for reinforcements
and investments in the transmission grid. 
One of the main components of policy monopolies is the establishment of insider- and
outsider-groups, as well as a structure that reinforces that understanding (Baumgartner &
Jones 1993:6). This notion of policy monopolies can be compared to the analytic terms used
to describe corporatist networks in the Norwegian context such as the segmented state, iron
triangles, and the fragmented state (Christensen et al. 2010; Østerrud 2002; Rommetvedt
2011). These terms has been used to describe policy fields where certain participants are
considered legitimate, as well as which values, perceptions of reality, and expertise is
considered legitimate. Participants in a segment may be from different organizations, the
bureaucracy and management, and parliamentary committees (Christensen et al. 2010:140).
2.2.2 Policy image and policy change
Baumgartner and Jones' policy monopoly differ from the aforementioned concepts in the
emphasis on policy image (Baumgartner & Jones 1993:7). Policy images can be understood
as the way in which a policy is communicated, and it consists of empirical information and
emotive appeals. Baumgartner and Jones refers to the emotive appeals component as the
policy images' tone. In stable and strong policy monopolies, there is a positive tone to the
dominant policy image, which underpins the policy monopoly. The tone is crucial in studying
policy change as rapid changes in the tone of a policy image is often a precursor to changes in
policy (Baumgartner & Jones 1993:26). Furthermore, these policy images often achieve a
hegemonic status in policy monopolies. This leads to 'agenda denial' through refusing
alternate interpretations, policies and ideas to be debated and evaluated (Howlett et al.
2009:106).
The successful establishment of a policy monopoly, entails that there is limited participation
and a hegemonic policy image. This entails that there is limited room for policy innovation
and alternative interpretations of the status quo, hence the policy development will be
incremental changes in policies over longer periods of time (True et al. 2007:162).
Baumgartner and Jones (1993:43) claim that strong policy monopolies will be able to
suppress agenda-setting initiatives by others. However, when issues are placed on the agenda
it entails that the hegemonic policy image is challenged and that the policy monopoly looses
control over the decision-making process. An issue may be placed on the Government's
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agenda by external shock or formal rules that govern the policy making process (Jones &
Baumgartner 2005:19). In this case, the interconnectors are placed on the Government's
agenda by formal rules. 
Often agenda-setting entails change of formal decision-making arena, which involves new
participants who may evaluate policies and policy-objectives differently as they represent
interests that diverge from the interests of the policy monopoly. The new participants in the
policy-making process and their interests may lead to a change in policy (Baumgartner &
Jones 1993:32–33). However, agenda setting and agenda access to new participants does not
immediately result in change, as change in policies is often blunted in the decision-making
process. But accessing the agenda is a precondition for change in policy content (True et al.
2007:159).
The legal framework ensures a change of formal decision-making arenas, in that Statnett has
to apply for an international trading license. Up until the application, all decisions has been
taken by Statnett, but with the application the institutional venue changes as MPE grants
trading licenses. MPE may view the electricity sector differently or have different priorities.
This change of decision-making arena also entails that the policy process is opened up to
actors outside the policy monopoly, that may have diverging opinions on the interconnectors.
As the public consultation is open to everybody, Statnett cannot limit participation, and hence
has to convince MPE that the interconnectors are needed both to ensure security of supply as
well as being economically profitable for society.
2.2.3 Summary
To sum, policy monopolies are structures that limits both participation and media coverage.
This structure is supported by a positive and hegemonic policy image, and as long as policy
development is located within the policy subsystem it leads to incremental change in policies.
The causal relationships is illustrated in the diagram below. It is also here important to note
that this is a simplification and an illustration of the theory, and it should not be interpreted as
a strict causal model. 
The model shows that a policy monopoly would have a negative effect on both media
coverage and participation. The model is similar to Culpepper's model in the notion that
media coverage in itself would have a positive effect on participation. In the introduction I
posed the following sub-research question: “To what degree is the policy process dominated
by powerful policy monopolies, thereby limiting participation of outsider-groups and limiting
media coverage?” According to Baumgartner and Jones' theory, if there is a policy monopoly
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advocating the interconnectors, the policy monopoly will support their policy by advocating a
positive and hegemonic policy image. The eventual existence of a policy monopoly and its
accompanying policy image will limit participation from outside actors and alternative
policies. 
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3 Methodology
In this chapter I will discuss the methodological aspects of this case study. I start this chapter
with a discussion of case study as a method, before I justify my choice of case. Thereafter I
will present the empirical evidence this thesis is based upon which is the responses to the
public consultation and an analysis of media coverage. In both cases I will present the
methodology, its purpose, data selection, and what information I wish the methods used shall
produce. I conclude the chapter by discussing validity, the generalization potential and
reliability of the research-design. 
3.1 Case study as a method
There are several definitions of a case-study, but for the purpose of this thesis I define it as
“the intensive study of a single case where the purpose of that study is – at least in part – to
shed light on a larger class of cases” (Gerring 2007:20). Gerring (2007:79–80) describes a
case study as a study into both the particular and the general. This may be further specified by
King, Keohane and Verba (1994:15) who emphasize that research should ideally fulfill two
criteria; the research should investigate a topic that is important in the real world and it should
contribute to our collective ability to construct scientific explanations to social phenomenons.
The specific topic of this thesis is participation in policy-making processes when the issue is
characterized by low salience and little media attention. There are a lot of political decisions
being made without scrutiny by the media and attention from the voters. Understanding the
political dynamic of how these decisions are made is important as these decisions may
represent unfair and undemocratic influence by powerful interests at the expense of the
public. But a case-study is also the study of the general. Gerring (2007:80–81) underlines the
importance of specifying the universe that the case represents. The universe of this case is the
study of democratic governance and participation. 
3.1.1 Case selection
This case was selected primarily based on personal interest in energy policy as well as the
interesting aspects of this case. The construction of interconnectors is a huge investment, and
NordLink alone has an estimated cost frame of 1.5 to 2 billion Euros, but there has practically
been no public debate about them. However, the selection of case based on personal or
idiosyncratic reasons are not necessary or sufficient justification the case study (King et al.
1994:15; Levy, 2008:7). As mentioned above, King et al. (1994) stresses the need for social
research to investigate social phenomenons that are important. As such, democratic
governance of issues that receive little media attention is important. Furthermore, the
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construction of interconnectors is also interesting in a bigger sense, as there are some political
drivers that are pushing for more interconnectors. In 2009, EU adopted its 20-20-20 strategy,
calling for 20 percent share of renewables in the end-consumption of electricity by 2020
(European Commission 2010). This entails huge investments in both renewables and grid
infrastructure, as renewable energy sources are usually located far from the large cities and
where people live. Furthermore, as most new renewables are variable renewables, it creates a
need for a more integrated transmission grid between countries. 
In the case selection, I chose to study the two interconnectors that are currently planned,
NordLink and NSN. The two interconnectors is seen as one case-study, as Statnett has
submitted a joint application for both. Another focus could have been to focus on Skagerrak 4,
which is the fourth interconnector between Norway and Denmark, which will be completed in
2014 and is operational from December 1st (Statnett 2014d). But seeing as Denmark and
Norway is already so closely integrated with 4 interconnectors, as well as being part of the
same electricity stock exchange, I deemed it more interesting to look at what represented a
more dramatic shift in policy. First of all, Germany and Britain are larger markets. Secondly,
the size of the planned interconnectors (1400MW each) is a large increase in exchange
capacity. In comparison, the total exchange capacity with Denmark is 1700MW, over four
interconnectors (Statnett 2014d). Furthermore, as Denmark is part of the NordPool electricity
stock exchange MPE has granted Statnett a general concession to trade electricity within the
Nordic region. The general concession entails that Statnett can construct as many
interconnectors they like within the Nordic region, without applying for a specific trading
license (Heiberg 2014). 
3.2 Methodology
In the coming sections I will explain in detail the different approaches and what I intend to
achieve by choosing these approaches. By applying different methodologies, or triangulating
methods, the aim is to strengthen the validity of the inferences (Bryman 2004; Lund 2002). I
will first elaborate on argumentation analysis as a method and the procedure for the media
analysis. 
3.2.1 Argumentation analysis
For the first part of my analysis, I have chosen to employ a method known as argumentation
analysis, which is one form of content analysis. The purpose of the analysis is to describe and
evaluate the argumentative element of the debate (Bergström & Boréus 2012). 
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Argumentation analysis is the analysis of logos, which are arguments that appeal to the
intellect. These are factual arguments, in contrast to pathos a n d ethos, which appeal to
authority or emotions (Bergström & Boréus 2012:91–92). I will employ a revised version of
Næss' pro- et contra argumentation analysis, which is a method that intends to identify the
thesis and their supporting arguments. The thesis is what the sender argues for or against, and
the arguments will be the claims that either support or oppose the thesis (Bergström & Boréus
2012:94–99). In the public consultation the thesis will be whether an organization supports or
opposes the interconnectors. The next step will be to identify the arguments used to support
the thesis, i.e. how organizations justifies their support or opposition to the interconnectors. 
There are several tools to choose from when conducting an argumentation analysis, and these
can be combined and modified to suit the goal of the research (Bergström & Boréus 2012:94).
It is often not necessary to conduct an argumentation analysis of the full document. This is
due to the time-consuming and labor-intensive nature of argumentation analysis. Furthermore,
it is often sufficient to identify the most important and most common arguments used in the
debate (Bergström & Boréus 2012:133). I will in my analysis limit my analysis to the most
common arguments used in the responses to the public consultation, as this is sufficient to
answer the research question. 
According to Bergström & Boréus (2012:93), an argumentation analysis can be used for three
purposes; descriptive, normatively or an evaluation of the argumentative power of an
argument. I will limit my analysis to a descriptive analysis of the argumentation, as whether
arguments meet normative standards and the evaluation of the power of an argument falls
outside the scope of this thesis, and is up to MPE and the Government to evaluate. 
Mapping of arguments in the public consultation
In chapter 6 where I present the empirical evidence, I will map organizations in four
categories: whether they support, are skeptical towards, are uncertain in regard to or oppose
the interconnectors. A mapping of the organizations position towards the interconnectors, will
help simplify the material as well as identify similarities and differences between the different
groups of actors. In addition, I will map the arguments most commonly used in the public
consultation. By this I intend to show variation within the different groups of actors. I have
classified the different arguments as either supportive arguments, opposing arguments or
uncertain arguments. The supporting and opposing arguments are easily understood, as they
either support or oppose the thesis, for or against interconnectors. The uncertain arguments
are arguments that can be used either in favor or opposing the interconnectors. The arguments
are identified by thorough reading of the responses and grouping the claims according to their
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content. This is then subsequently mapped in a table illustrating the arguments used most
commonly, which is presented in chapter 5. 
3.2.2 Media coverage
The analysis of media coverage has two purposes. The first is to measure salience. It is
difficult to measure salience, and Culpepper utilizes a shortcut, arguing that media coverage is
one way to infer salience (Culpepper 2011:7). Another way of measuring salience is through
surveys where voters are asked about their attitudes. However, in this case there are no
surveys to my knowledge, where attitudes towards energy policy is mapped thoroughly. In the
election survey of 2009, the participants where asked if they disagree or not with the
statement that more hydroelectric power plants should be developed (Berglund et al. 2011:59).
This question does not at all cover all the aspects of my case, and is only remotely linked to
the issue of interconnectors. This leads me to employ the same shortcuts as Culpepper, and
measure salience indirectly via media coverage. 
To measure salience I have compared the media coverage of the interconnectors with two
other energy related issues. This does not provide a definitive answer as to what constitutes a
permanent high or low salience issue, however the comparison illustrates the coverage of the
interconnectors in relation to other energy-related issues. The issues I have chosen as
comparison is the media coverage of electricity prices and the construction of transmission
Sima-Samnanger. The issue of electricity prices is a recurring issue, as the price fluctuates
both within and between years, which is reflected in the data. The transmission line Sima-
Samnanger was covered extensively by the media and there was a considerable public outcry
against Statnett's plans, because it entailed construction of transmission grid in alongside and
over the Hardanger Fjord. This was a very controversial issue, which spurred a lot of media
attention, and represents the media attention that a single energy project might gain. 
The other purpose of the media analysis is to provide more specific information about the
media coverage of the interconnectors. This part of the analysis is limited to providing
information about how the coverage has been in qualitative terms, by looking at when and in
which newspapers the issue of interconnectors has been covered. 
Execution of the quantitative media analysis
I have used the Retriever's archive service ATEKST, which is a media archive covering both
Norwegian newspapers and journals as well as online sources since 1945. I have limited the
search to Norwegian printed media as this allowed for a more precise analysis. Furthermore, I
have limited the scope of the search to national and regional newspapers as well as national
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journals. In Appendix 1, I have elaborated on the search parameters for all the searches,
enabling replication of the analysis. 
For the comparison between these three energy issues, I have used the analysis tool provided
by ATEKST, where excel-sheets of the search data can be downloaded. These sheets have
been merged to produce the comparison. In addition to the numbers downloaded from
ATEKST, I have also calculated the average number of newspaper articles per year for
“electricity price” for illustrative purposes. The time-frame for the media analysis is articles
written about the three issues from 01.01.2000 to 30.06.2014. A long time-frame was chosen
to illustrate development over time. The end-point of the analysis was set at the end of June to
show the coverage in the first half of 2014. 
More or less the same procedure was used for the second part of the media analysis, where the
media coverage of the interconnectors is more specifically investigated. I used the same
search parameters, and exported statistics from the analysis tool provided by ATEKST.
However, I chose to export more detailed statistics in the second analysis, where media
coverage was broken down by year and newspaper. 
There are some weaknesses in the media analysis, leading to an overestimation of the
numbers. This is because ATEKST includes all articles that fits the search parameters, not
separating between journalistic articles and letters to the editor. In addition, the searches
themselves presents a challenge. When searching for issues such as electricity prices, Sima-
Samnanger and interconnectors these issues may be discussed and referred to in relation to
other issues or in other contexts not related to the specific issues I intend to cover. This may
also lead to an overestimation of the numbers. 
In spite of these problems with the ATEKST search, I argue that the results are valid. There is
the possibility of measurement errors in relation to what is counted as hits and the content of
the hits. However, this is valid for all the searches, so it does not change the general picture.
In addition, the graph presents an illustration of the media coverage which to a high degree is
coherent with other empirical evidence. I will elaborate more on this in chapter 6, when I
present the results of the media analysis.
3.3 Validity and reliability
Validity refers to whether it is possible to draw valid inferences from the data (Hellevik
2002:183). Or phrased another way: is the data gathered relevant to answer the research
question? Reliability on the other hand, concerns itself with the accuracy of gathering and
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analyzing data. In other words: are other researchers going to draw the same inferences, if
they had done the same research with the same material (Hellevik 2002:183). In the following
sections I will elaborate on the rigorousness of the research design. 
3.3.1 Validity
There is some difference of opinion regarding how validity in qualitative research should be
regarded, and there are several ways of conceptualizing validity. Validity refers to the
correspondence between what a researcher says she is measuring and what she is actually
measuring (Bryman 2004:273). Once central concept is the notion of construct validity.
Construct validity refers to the coherence between the concept being studied and the empirical
indicators that measure the concepts. If the chosen operationalization correspond well with the
concept under study, a satisfactory construct validity is achieved (Lund 2002:93). In general I
deem the construct validity to be good. The dependent variable, participation, is measured by
who has actually participated in the public consultation. The concepts of policy monopoly,
and technical and complex issues are descriptive concepts.
The concept with the most problematic construct validity is the notion of low salience. In my
material salience is measured indirectly, through media coverage. Culpepper argues It is
reasonable to remark that there are grounds to question this operationalization. There is ample
literature that describes the interaction between voters and media, amongst other the agenda
setting effect of the media. Studies has found that the media's agenda becomes the reader's
agenda (see i.e. Jenssen & Aalberg 2007; McCombs & Shaw 1972). The agenda-setting effect
of the media is somewhat contradictory to Culpepper's (2011:7) argument that media coverage
is one way to infer salience. The agenda-setting effect of the media suggests that media
coverage influences salience, rather than being a measure of salience. However, this is the
operationalization that Culpepper utilizes, hence I deem it an acceptable operationalization. 
When written sources are utilized, it is also relevant to evaluate the written sources in
themselves. Kjeldstali (1999) applies four criteria to evaluate whether the source material is
fit to answer the research question. The four criteria are availability, external source critique,
identifying the content and internal source critique (Kjeldstali 1999:161–173). Availability
refers to what sources are available for analysis, and whether they are complete and
representative. According to George and Bennett (2004:94–98), reconstructing political
debates is a challenging task and one has to be wary not to cherry-pick data. I do not consider
availability of data a problematic issue in this research design. This is mainly due to the use of
public sources. For the media analysis, all articles are searchable. The critical aspect is to
specify the search parameters in such a manner that it includes all relevant articles. The public
22 Methodology
consultation is, as its name states, public, and all the responses are freely available online. 
The second criteria, external source critique, concerns itself with identifying the purpose and
the source of the text (Kjeldstali 1999). In the responses to the public consultation the source
of the response is clearly stated, and the purpose of the text is to state a position towards a
proposal, argue for that position, and influence the outcome of the decision-making process in
MPE. As the media analysis only is a quantitative media analysis, counting how many articles
are published about the issues, the second criteria, external source critique is not relevant. 
The third criteria is to find the content of the text (Kjeldstali 1999). In the context of the
public consultation this refers to identifying attitudes towards the proposal. This is achieved
by means of an argumentation analysis, where the thesis and the supporting arguments is
identified. The last criteria, internal source critique, refers to whether the content of the texts
is relevant for the research question (Kjeldstali 1999). In my opinion, the responses to the
public consultation are very relevant sources, as these state what organizations publicly mean
in regard to a specific question. One source of error might be that organization's might have
chosen a different line of argumentation or different arguments, had they stated their position
in private settings. However, there is no ground to believe that organizations advocate a
different position towards interconnectors in private than in public settings. As such, the
public consultations will give a fair picture of the opinions of the organizations that have
chosen to respond. 
Generalization
The purpose of a case study is “the intensive study of a single case where the purpose of that
study is – at least in part – to shed light on a larger class of cases” (Gerring 2007:20).
Generalization is to draw inferences from the specific case to a wider set of cases, and in
order to generalize a finding one has to know what this is a case of, or what is the case's
universe (Bryman 2004:285). In this case, the universe of this study was defined above as
democratic governance, and the specific topic of the study was defined above as participation
in policy making in a context of low political salience. 
This thesis only looks at one case in examining what influences participation in policy process
where the issue is characterized by low political salience. The findings can therefore not
automatically be generalized to a larger class of cases. However, it is an ambition of this study
to provide some insight into what characterizes and influences participation in settings where
there is little media attention. The analytical framework provides a framework for interpreting
the findings. This way the findings may provide some insights that may be useful in other
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studies investigating participation in public policy-making processes characterized by low
salience. 
3.3.2 Reliability
Reliability refers to the rigorousness of the data gathering and analysis of the data, and as
stated above, one way of measuring reliability is whether other researchers would have
attained the same results if they had conducted the same investigation with the same material
(Hellevik 2002:183). This is a challenge with the social sciences as there is seldom hard facts,
rather the facts are open for interpretations. This especially so, when it comes to qualitative
data (Gerring 2007:70). Concerning any analysis of textual material, both the interpretation of
the text and the intersubjectivity presents reliability challenges (Bergström & Boréus 2012). 
With argumentation analysis there is especially one challenge to be aware of, and that occurs
when one trues to reconstruct an argumentation. In the analysis of a text, researchers may
employ different interpretation strategies, and the restructuring of a text may be conducted in
several manners. In addition, the analysis is a process of interpretation that may influence the
outcome (Bergström & Boréus 2012:131). The danger is creating a line of argument that do
not represent the senders' intention. In the empirical chapter, a sender-oriented approach is
attempted, and in that a wish to investigate the actors' position and arguments based on the
context and their understanding. However, in the analysis, it is necessary to systematize and
simplify the responses, and in this process there is always a room for interpretation that differs
from the senders' intention. To strengthen the reliability, I have therefore strived to be as
transparent as possible in both the presentation of the empirics and the analysis, and by that
give the reader the resources to themselves judge the interpretations made and inferences
drawn. 
With any text analysis, there is a challenge of reliability in regard to the selection of material,
as text analysis is a labor intensive method (Bergström & Boréus 2012:131). Which texts are
deemed relevant may be subject to the discretion of the researcher, hence threatening the
reliability. However, in this thesis I analyze all responses to the public consultation as well as
newspaper articles published in the period from 2006 to 2013. Hence, there is no selection of
relevant texts that would threaten the reliability of this investigation. 
Based on the discussion above, I believe that this thesis shows both high validity and
reliability. 
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4 Background
A prerequisite for discussing electricity policy is a basic understanding of the electricity
system and knowledge of the actors operating within this policy field. The aim of this chapter
is to provide all the necessary background information necessary to understand the sector.
Firstly there is a presentation on the physical infrastructure pertaining to the notion of
electricity grids as well as the policy objectives of electricity grids. Next I continue by
elaborating on the responsibilities of the Transmission System Operator and the legislative
framework in place to regulate and control the electricity sector. 
4.1 Physical infrastructure and policy objectives
Electricity grids play a vital role in the electricity system, as it connects the producers and
consumers of electricity together. There is three types of electricity grids in Norway: the
distribution grid, regional grid, and the transmission grid. The transmission grid consists
mainly of 300 kV and 420 kV transmission grid as well as interconnectors. Statnett is the
main grid utility of the transmission grid, owning approximately 90 percent (Meld. St. 14
2011-2012:7). The regional and distribution grid connects the transmission grid with the
consumers. The regional and distribution grids transfer electricity at a lower voltage than the
transmission grid, and are owned by local or regional grid utilities. There are in total 148 grid
utilities (Reiten 2014:46).
With regard to electricity grids, there are two policy objectives; quality of supply and security
of supply. Whereas quality of supply refers to the utilities' ability to deliver electricity of the
right frequency, security of supply refers to the robustness of the system (Inderberg 2012:14).
The latter is, amongst other, reflected through the n-1 criteria, which is a general requirement
that supply should be upheld if one component in the system fails. Furthermore, it also entails
enough transmission capacity to transfer and deliver electricity according to demand. This
entails that there is capacity in the system to both deliver electric effect when consumption
changes, as well as the provision of electricity continuously throughout the year. As such there
is a need to have enough installed effect to handle peak load during wintertime, as well as
enough capacity to provide electricity throughout the year. (NOU 2012). 
The quality of supply, refers to the technical side of electricity supply. In supplying electricity
it is important to ensure real-time balance between consumption and production of electricity.
A mismatch between demand and supply leads to changes in voltage that may damage the
electricity grids, transformers as well as household appliances and in worst case scenarios
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lead to overloading the electricity system causing large scale fall-outs in the delivery of
electricity (NOU 2012:54). 
4.2 Transmission System Operator
As mentioned above, there are two policy objectives concerning the transmission of
electricity: the quality and the security of supply (Inderberg 2012:14). To ensure both of these
policy objectives, there is a need for proper coordination and overview to ensure that enough
electricity is produced to cover demand, as well as the physical infrastructure to transmit the
electricity to the consumers. This coordination and overview responsibility is delegated to
Statnett, as the Transmission System Operator (TSO). The responsibilities of the TSO is stated
in the Energy Act and is further specified in the “Regulation of the system-responsibilities in
the electricity system” (NVE 2002). 
In the regulation the principles for the execution of the system responsibility is defined.
Paragraph 4 states amongst other that the TSO shall ensure real-time balance with a sufficient
quality at any given moment, act in a neutral and non-discriminating manner, and develop
market based solutions that contributes to an effective utilization of the electricity system
(NVE 2002). This entails that Statnett has a responsibility to coordinate maintenance work,
including routine disconnections of transmission lines, as well as setting temporary
restrictions on the quantity of transmitted electricity. Furthermore, Statnett coordinates all
actors with operations relating to the transmission grid, to ensure optimum utilization of the
combined resources (Statnett 2013b). 
As part of the requirements to ensure real-time balance between production and consumption,
Statnett as the TSO has a responsibility to organize trade in electricity. Trade in electricity is
organized through the Nordic electricity stock exchange, Nord Pool Spot. The main market is
the Elspot market, which is a market that trades electricity hour for hour the following day. In
addition to the electricity stock exchange, Statnett also manages the capacity market, which is
a market that operates within the operating hour. Here Statnett pays to increase or decrease
production to ensure that there is real-time balance between production and consumption.
Statnett's responsibilities are to ensure that these markets functions properly (NVE 2002). 
To ensure the proper incentives for other grid utilities Statnett, as the TSO, has the authority to
decide on bidding areas for electricity. Bidding areas is a measure to identify bottlenecks in
the transmission of electricity. Bottlenecks occur when there is a mismatch between
consumption and production of electricity within a specified geographical area, as well as a
limited transmission capacity in and out of the area. The creation of bidding areas is an
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incentive to either increase electricity production or invest in increased transmission capacity
in the area. The bidding areas are in place until there is no bottleneck in the transmission of
electricity. Bottleneck tariffs refer to the tariff charged to transmitting electricity between two
bidding areas (Skjold & Thue 2007:602).
4.3 The legal framework
The legal framework for the electricity sector, relevant for this case, consists of mainly the
Energy Act and its adjacent regulations. Whereas the guiding principles for the sector is stated
in the Energy Act, the different regulations are more specified. The purpose of the Energy Act,
as stated in § 1-2 is to ensure that production, transformation, transmission, turnover,
distribution, and use of electricity is undertaken in an economically rational manner
(Energiloven 2013). Further, the Energy Act specifies the principles for upgrading
infrastructure or commencing new energy projects, such as requirements for public
consultations, who should be heard and in which manner. Regarding interconnectors the
Energy Act specifies in § 4-2 that when applications for concession is evaluated, there is an
absolute requirement of economic profitability, and that each application should be evaluated
in relation to other competing projects (Energiloven 2013). 
One of the most important regulations pertaining to this case is the regulation of grid utilities.
As mentioned in section 2.1.1, electricity grids are natural monopolies and hence needs
regulation to ensure that grid utilities do not misuse their market position. This entails
legislation of the grid utilities to treat all electricity producers in a non-discriminatory manner.
In addition, NVE is delegated the authority to decide the income-frames of the grid utilities, to
ensure proper pricing of the services. The income-frame is determined so that the income over
time covers the cost of operation and depreciation, as well as provide a reasonable surplus
given efficient operation, management and development of the grid (NVE, 2014). 
In relation to Statnett, they have two sources of income: the bottleneck tariff and the
transmission tariff. The transmission tariff is a fee paid by all customers utilizing the
transmission grid. The bottleneck tariff is a tariff charged for transmitting electricity between
two bidding areas (Statnett 2014a:12). The tariff is calculated as the price difference between
two bidding areas multiplied with the amount of electricity transmitted (NOU 2012:173). 
4.4 The application process
The process to apply for concession to construct interconnectors is a two-fold process as the
competences to evaluate and give concessions is divided between the MPE and NVE. The
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MPE has retained the authority to grant licenses for international trade in electricity (§4-2, the
Energy Act), whereas the NVE is delegated the authority to grant construction licenses (§3-1,
the Energy Act), hence Statnett has to attain two separate licenses to go forward with the
project. 
There is an extensive process that has to be followed to get a construction license and an
international trading license for interconnectors. When Statnett decides to go forward with a
project, they have to send a notification to NVE, which is then sent on a public consultation.
Here all interested parties may come with inputs on what should be included in the impact
assessment. Based on the inputs from the public consultation NVE decides on the
requirements for the impact assessment, and the process is referred back to Statnett. Statnett
then prepares both the application and the impact assessment for NVE. When NVE receives
the application and impact assessment this is sent on a public consultation. For big energy
projects this also entails the organization of public meetings in the municipalities directly
affected. Based on the input from the public consultation, NVE decides on whether a given
project should be licensed. This decision may be appealed to MPE, which after another round
of proceedings finally decides on the matter (NOU 2012:80–81). 
The process described above only applies to the construction license needed. In addition,
Statnett needs an international trading license which is granted by MPE. This process includes
an application, with an analysis of the economic profitability of the project. This application is
sent on a public consultation, before the MPE decides on the issue of giving a concession or
not. 
Public consultation is an important tool for the Government to obtain information and views
on energy projects from all interested and affected parties. The Government may choose to
include sectoral and special interests in the policy making through participation in committees
etc. However, the Government also considers it a democratic right for all to participate in
public policy making, and this is achieved through public consultations. In the case of
electricity policies, all applications for concessions either for construction of electricity grids
or power generation is sent on a public consultation. Through public consultations all affected
parties shall have an opportunity to make their case heard with the decision-makers.
Furthermore, public consultations are used to ensure the opportunity for all sides of a policy
or a matter should be illuminated before a decision is made (Regjeringen 2006). 
4.4.1 Public controversy and energy issues
Energy projects usually create local opposition based on concerns about falling property
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values, visual effects, health risks, and the effects on the environment (see i.e. Cain & Nelson
2013; Jackson & Pitts 2010; van der Horst 2007; Wolsink 2000). In Norway, the
environmental concerns include damage to or the destruction of ecosystems by hydroelectric
power plants, noise in the immediate vicinity of and wildlife concerns regarding wind-farms
(NOU 2012:77). Regarding transmission lines the main concern is the area they occupy,
especially when they are placed in nature conservation areas or in the migration path of for
instance reindeer (NOU 2012:78). 
One controversial project in recent time is the construction of transmission grid from Sima to
Samnanger. The transmission grid was necessary to ensure the security of supply for the area
north of the Hardanger fjord. The project caused national opposition as the transmission grid
was planned alongside the Hardanger fjord and through a nature conservation area. The
opponents of the project did not challenge the need for the transmission grid, rather that the
transmission grid should be replaced by sea-cable. NVE supported Statnett's application for
transmission grid, a decision which was appealed to MPE. MPE originally supported NVEs
decision, however they were pushed to postpone the commencement of construction and they
commissioned four independent commissions to ensure the quality of Statnett's application
and the sea-cable alternative (Eriksen et al. 2011:5). The overall picture from these
independent commissions where support for Statnett's application and in 2011 construction
commenced (NOU 2012:24). 
4.5 The price of electricity
The price of electricity is determined by the market, based on supply and demand. The
Norwegian electricity system is mainly based on hydropower, so the price varies with
precipitation. In general the inflow of water occurs in the late spring, early summer months,
whereas the bulk of electricity is consumed during late fall, winter and early spring. The price
hence varies throughout the year, as the supply and demand changes, with higher prices
during wintertime when supply is strained and demand is high (NOU 2012:27). In addition to
the intra-yearly variations in price, there are considerable variations in precipitation between
years, which may vary in the scale of 60 TWh from a dry-year to a wet-year (ibid.:28). The
difference between dry-years and wet-years is considerable, as the average yearly production
from hydropower is 125 TWh (ibid.:27). 
The price of electricity is determined on the electricity stock exchange Nord Pool Spot. Nord
Pool Spot was established as a cooperation between Norway and Sweden in 1996, and has
expanded to include most of the Nordic countries, as well as partly integration with the Baltic
countries, Germany, and the UK (Nord Pool Spot 2014). Through Nord Pool Spot Norway has
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access to electricity produced in the whole region, and there is considerable export and import
within the Nordic and Baltic region. As such, the price of electricity in Norway is not only
reliant on precipitation, but also developments in the other Nordic countries. In the Nordic
countries, there are considerable investments in the energy sectors being made. All the Nordic
countries are planning to increase their production capacities, and there is an expectation that
there will be a considerable surplus of electricity and net export of electricity in the years up
until 2050 (NOU 2012:108). 
4.5.1 International trade in electricity
Concerning international trade in electricity, given that there are interconnectors to transmit
electricity, the amount of electricity exported and imported is determined by the differences in
electricity price. This means that a country will export when the price of electricity is lower
and import when the price is higher than the neighboring countries (NOU, 2012, p. 181). 
There are considerable differences in the price structure between the Norwegian and Swedish
markets on the one side, and Germany on the other, as indicated in illustration 4.1 below. As
can be seen from the graph, the price in Oslo and to a lesser extent Sweden is very stable
compared to Germany. The main reason for the difference is the energy sources utilized to
cover demand. A majority of Norway's energy supply stems from adjustable hydropower,
where the production may be adjusted within minutes at very low marginal costs. The energy
system in Germany, on the other side, is characterized by thermal plants as the main energy
bearer and an increasing share of variable renewables. Adjustments in production takes place
in thermal plants at high marginal costs. In addition, as the demand rises, more and more
expensive energy bearers are utilized, pushing the prices upwards (NOU 2012). 
It is important to note that the picture is rapidly changing in Germany. In 2000 Germany
adopted ambitious policies aimed at changing the composition of their energy bearers, a
policy that is popularly known as the Energiewende. The Energiewende is well underway, and
entails huge investments in and subsidies to renewables. In the end-consumption of electricity,
renewables account for approximately 20 percent. The goals of the Energiewende is 50
percent renewables in 2030 and above 80 percent in 2050 (Agora Energiewende 2013). 
These goals are ambitious, but Germany has managed to increase the share of renewables
from practically nothing in 2000 to approximately 20 percent today. If Germany manages to
successfully implement the ambitions in the Energiewende, it will influence the whole
electricity sector. There are huge investments in variable renewables, which has low marginal
costs. When these renewables covers demand, the prices drop close to zero (Agora
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Energiewende 2013). Increasing shares of renewables will influence the electricity price
development in Germany. The investments in solar energy, which produces electricity during
daytime when demand is highest, will push prices downwards in the hours when the price
difference between Norway and Germany is greatest (Statnett 2013a:53).  
The British market is rather different from the German market. In 2011, the British market
was dominated by thermal plants, mainly gas but also a considerable share of coal and nuclear
(Pöyry 2012:4). However, there is an expectation that there will be an increase in the share of
renewables. Great Britain is committed by the Renewable Energy Directive adopted by the
European Union, where they have committed to a 15% share of electricity from renewables in
2020 (European Parliament and Council 2009:Annex I). Most of this increase in renewables
will be in the form of wind-energy, and as with Germany, the low marginal cost of renewables
as well as their unpredictability will influence the British energy system when the share of
renewables increases (Pöyry 2012:6). 
Illustration 4.1: Average price variation within the week for Oslo, Germany, and Sweden, 2002-2011.
Source: NOU 2012:176. 
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5 Empirical evidence: The electricity policy subsystem 
In the analytical framework a lot of concepts where presented, such as policy monopoly,
incremental policy changes, which are inherently descriptive concepts. To investigate these
descriptive concepts I will in this chapter provide relevant documentation about the electricity
policy subsystem. Firstly I will elaborate on the interconnectors, their perceived benefits to
society and Statnett' application to attain the necessary licenses for the two proposed
interconnectors. In the second section I elaborate on the structure of the electricity sector and
how the different actors relate. 
5.1 Interconnectors
5.1.1 What is the purpose of the interconnectors?
The purpose of the interconnectors are that by connecting electricity markets, electricity
prices will trigger exports or imports. When there is a price difference between two areas,
such as Norway and Germany, electricity is imported to the area with the highest prices,
thereby reducing the upward pressure on prices as demand peaks. Economic theory predicts
that trade and liberalization will increase efficiency, thereby maximize consumer and producer
surpluses. In this setting and simplified, consumer surpluses are reduced electricity prices, and
producer surpluses are increased electricity prices. In addition to the consumer and producer
surpluses, the interconnector will result in increased income through taxes and subsidies
(Aune et al. 2008). When the government invests in infrastructure projects, the main aim is
not necessarily economic profit. There is also room to take into consideration the societal
profitability, where the benefit is not merely measured in economic gain for a company but
the aggregated benefits of all inhabitants (Bonin et al. 2013). 
Statnett's application for an international trading license includes a comprehensive economic
analysis of the consequences of these interconnectors on the Norwegian electricity system.
There is a legal requirement of economic profitability that has to be fulfilled to get a license
for interconnectors (§6-1, the Energy Act). According to the analysis, the interconnectors will
be economically profitable, and they estimate the societal benefit for each interconnector in
the range between 120 to 160 million EUR per year (Statnett 2013c). The direct economic
benefit will be from the bottleneck income provided for transmitting electricity between two
areas with different prices. The indirect effects, or less visible effects will be the consumer
and producer surpluses. Here Statnett admits that it is likely that the producer surplus is larger
than the consumer surplus. Statnett justifies this distribution of surplus by arguing that the
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security of supply is strengthened for the consumers (Statnett 2013a:63). 
The consequences of the interconnectors on the electricity price in Norway is most likely a
higher price volatility within the day, but a lower price volatility throughout the year and
between years (Statnett 2013a:56–60). The reason for this is the structure of the electricity
sector in Norway, where the bulk of precipitation is during the spring and summer months and
the bulk of consumption is during wintertime. With the interconnectors, the general picture is
that Norway will export electricity during the spring and summer months, increasing the price
in Norway during these months. During wintertime there will be an increase in imports
reducing the upwards pressure on the electricity price. In sum, however, the interconnectors
will bring the price-level of electricity in Norway closer to the price-level in Germany and
Great Britain (Statnett 2013a:56). This conclusion is also supported by independent analysis
(see i.e. Taule et al. 2012). However, all analyses are based on a lot of variables that are not
easily predicted, such as future electricity consumption (which for one is influenced by the
effectiveness of electricity efficiency policies), future precipitation, future construction of
renewable energy sources, as well as a lot of other factors. 
5.1.2 Interconnectedness of the Norwegian electricity grid
The first interconnector was constructed between Norway and Sweden in 1960, and since the
1960s the transmission capacity to both Sweden and Denmark has increased (Meld. St. 14
2011-2012:16). After the liberalization reform in 1990, there was a push to construct
interconnectors. A third interconnector to Denmark was operational from 1993, and several
projects to Germany and the Netherlands where applied for. For instance a license was
granted to Statnett for a 600 MW interconnector between Norway and Germany, which was to
be operational from 2003. However, the German cooperation partner withdrew from the
agreement in 1999. In addition Statkraft had a license for a 600 MW interconnector to
Germany, to be operational from 2003. This agreement was also terminated by the German
cooperation partners in 2001. The main reason why these projects failed to be realized was the
ongoing liberalization processes in the EU, which showed a surplus of electricity in Germany
(Skjold & Thue 2007:579–80). 
The only interconnector that was realized in this period (in addition to the one to Denmark),
was the NorNed interconnector. This interconnector illustrates another problem concerning
the construction of interconnectors, which is the long time-frame for realization of the
projects. The licenses for the NorNed interconnector was granted in 1994, and it was
operational from 2007 (Skjold & Thue 2007:581). The main argument for increasing the
transmission capacity during the 90s was the surplus of electricity. This had changed by the
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entry into the millennia, where the emphasis was put on security of supply (Skjold & Thue
2007:580–81). As the historical review shows, the current application to construct two new
interconnectors follows a trend that started with the identification of a large electricity surplus
during the late 80s and the following liberalization of the electricity sector in 1990 (Skjold &
Thue 2007:468–76, 496–97). 
There are currently a number of interconnectors that are operational, which connect the
Nordic region together as well as the Nordic region with its neighbors. Below is a map that
illustrates the transmission capacity in 2011 and the planned transmission capacity in 2020. In
addition to the transmission capacity illustrated below, there is a transmission capacity of
about 3600 MW between Norway and Sweden (NOU 2012:160). 
From this illustration it is visible that a large increase in the interconnectedness between the
Nordic, the Baltic and North European region is planned. In addition to Norway increasing
their transmission capacity with 3400 MW (including Skagerrak 4), Denmark is increasing
their transmission capacity with 1400 MW (not including Skagerrak 4 and increased
transmission capacity to Sweden), Sweden with 1700 MW and Finland with 650 MW. 
5.1.3 Timeline of Statnett's applications
The process to construct an interconnector to Great Britain has so far taken more than a
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decade. In 2001 NVE granted Statnett the license for the technical solutions for an
interconnector to Great Britain (NVE 2001). However, in 2003 MPE declined Statnett's
application for an international trading license with Great Britain based on uncertainties
regarding the economic profitability of the project (MPE 2003). Even though Statnett's
application was denied, they retained the construction license, and this license is part of the
current application. 
The application for an interconnector to Germany is a bit more complicated. As mentioned in
section 4.4 the process starts with a notification to NVE. This notification was sent in 2007 by
NorGer KS, which was then a cooperation project between Lyse, Agder Energi and the Swiss-
German company EGL (Rosvold 2010). NorGer sent its application in 2009 to NVE, and
Statnett sent the application for the competing interconnector NordLink in 2010. In the
meantime Statnett bought NorGer KS in 2011, and now has ownership over both projects. An
assessment was made that the domestic electricity grid could currently only handle one 1400
MW interconnector to Germany (NVE 2013:16). 
5.2 The actors
There are several actors that are active in the field of electricity policy. In this section I will
give a brief introduction to the actors and their placement in society. I will commence with the
different public actors, then continue with actors grouped after their role in the electricity
sector. I will mainly focus on the actors that has responded to the public consultation. 
5.2.1 The central administration – the Ministry and Directorate
The Government is responsible for developing new policies and new legislation, as well as
ensuring that the policies and legislation adopted by Parliament is put into life. Within the
Government, the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE) is in charge of the energy sector,
whereas the Ministry of Climate and Environment (MCE) has the responsibility to ensure that
the energy projects complies with environmental standards. 
MPE consists of the political leadership and the administration (Christensen et al. 2010:54).
The political leadership consists of the Minister as well as political staff. The political
leadership is constitutionally responsible to the Parliament and aims to achieve the political
goals set out in the governmental platform. The administrations' task can be divided in two:
constitutional and management tasks. The constitutional tasks consist of following up and
implementing political decisions by Government and Parliament. The management tasks are
policy development, including preparing, proposing and implementing measures. The
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administration is a tool for the political leadership in the development of the Minister's and
Government's policy (Christensen et al. 2010:110). 
In the Norwegian context the term Directorate applies to all central administration agencies
that is not part of a Ministry (Christensen et al. 2010:56). Directorates are delegated
management and administrative responsibilities related to exercising authority and execution
of policy, and to a lesser extent political tasks related to policy formulation. However, many
Directorates may have influence on the governmental policy through its professional expertise
(Christensen et al. 2010:110). The Norwegian Water Resource and Energy Directorate (NVE),
is the regulator of the electricity system with delegated authority from MPE to oversee the
sector, and ensure that the rules and regulations are followed. NVE has been delegated the
authority to write new regulations in specific areas as wall as authority to license energy
projects, except large scale hydropower where the MPE and Government has retained the
licensing authority (NOU 2012:81). MPE is also involved in licensing energy projects as
appeals over NVE's decisions are decided by the Government, after recommendations from
MPE. 
5.2.2 The public enterprise – Statnett
Statnett was established as a public enterprise in 1992, as a result of the liberalization reform
of 1990. Public enterprise was then a new way of organizing public ownership, and there is
only a handful of public enterprises in Norway. The law of public enterprise was adopted in
1991, and the rationale was to have a public steering form that allows for the combination of
both sector-political goals and efficient management (Christensen et al. 2010:64). The law of
public enterprise regulates amongst other the relationship between MPE and Statnett. In §38 it
is stated that the Government exercises its authority only through the Enterprise meeting,
which is a meeting between the Minister and the Board. The decision-making power of the
Enterprise meeting is the Minister. It is further specified that the Government cannot exercise
its ownership in any other way than the Enterprise meeting (§38, Lov om statsforetak 1991). 
The only political guideline determined by MPE is §1 of Statnett's statues where it is stated
that Statnett is the TSO, and that Statnett shall be responsible for an economic efficient
management and development of the transmission grid (Statnett 2014b). This is a further
specification of the Energy Act §1-2, the Energy Act Regulation §1-2 and §6-1 where the
policy objective is management of the electricity system in a socially efficient manner
(Energiloven 2013; Energilovforskriften 2012). However, there is no political steering in
regard to how Statnett should achieve the policy objectives. 
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Statnett's position in the electricity sector
There are some inherent characteristics of the electricity system that provides Statnett with a
central position in the electricity sector. As electricity grids are characterized by a natural
monopoly, it also entails that some actors are designated as monopoly owners of electricity
grids within a certain area. It is not necessarily given that there is mainly one owner of the
transmission grid. For instance, there are four TSOs in Germany, each operating the
transmission grid in their own geographical region (ENTSO-E 2014a). However, the
Norwegian Parliament has chosen to concentrate the ownership of the transmission grid in
Statnett. The government commission on a better organized electricity grid finds that the
organization of the ownership of the transmission grid is satisfactory (Reiten 2014:43). 
The ownership of the transmission grid has been concentrated in Statnett who currently owns
approximately 90 percent (Reiten 2014:43). MPE has decided that Statnett has the
responsibility to manage and develop the transmission grid in Norway (Statnett 2014b). This
entails that Statnett has agenda-setting powers in regard to defining which projects are
needed, and how to prioritize between projects. Even though they need licenses for all their
projects, NVE is in no position to propose alternative solution or prioritizing projects
differently. They can require Statnett to evaluate alternative technical solutions or alternative
pathways for the transmission grid, but this is after Statnett has identified a need. The only
requirement Statnett needs to fulfill is to ensure economically rational management of the
transmission grid (ibid. 2014b).  
The concentration of ownership in the transmission grid, was enhanced in 2013 when the
Parliament amended the Energy Act to specify that interconnectors could only be owned and
operated by the TSO or a company where the TSO has decisive influence (§6-1 in
Energiloven 2013). Previously, ownership over interconnectors was not regulated by law,
which resulted in several initiatives to construct interconnectors. One such initiative was the
aforementioned NorGer KS, which was a cooperation between Agder Energi, Lyse and EGL
(Rosvold 2010). Statnett overtook the ownership over NorGer KS in 2011 (NVE 2013:5). It
was later decided that NordLink would be prioritized, and that NorGer would continue to be
developed with a timeframe of realization within 10 years after NordLink is operational
(Statnett 2013e).  Another example is North Connect, which is a cooperation project between
actors in Norway, Sweden, Scotland and the UK with the purpose of constructing an
interconnector from western Norway to Scotland. There is a split ownership, where 50 percent
of the shares are on either side of the North Sea. The Norwegian ownership is split between
four energy producers, Agder Energi, Lyse Produksjon, E-CO Energi AS, and Vattenfall
(NorthConnect 2013:7).  
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Through the ownership of the transmission grid and the current interconnectors Statnett is the
main provider and generator of information about the current situation of the transmission
grid and the electricity system. For instance NVE as the regulator has asked Statnett to assess
how many interconnectors the current transmission grid can handle. Statnett has assessed that
there is currently room for one interconnector from southern Norway (NVE, 2013, p. 16) and
one from western Norway (Statnett, 2013d, p. 8). This assessment effectively puts a stop into
other projects if Statnett is granted licenses for the two projects they have applied for. 
As a TSO Statnett has the responsibility to prepare and adopt national grid development plans.
Through these plans Statnett identifies the need for grid reinforcements and new projects that
need to be realized to ensure a satisfactory security of supply in the whole country. A national
grid development plan is published yearly. In addition a long term grid development plan is
prepared. The last long-term plan was developed for the period 2008-2025 (Statnett 2008). In
the long-term plan it is stated that one of Statnett's main strategies in this period is to facilitate
the construction of economically profitable interconnectors (Statnett 2008:5). This position is
supported in the subsequent yearly national plans (see Statnett 2010, 2011). 
In their regional plan for southern Norway (the Agder counties and southern Rogaland) they
state that there is a need to reinforce the Eastern Corridor to facilitate Skagerrak 4 or another
interconnector, and that reinforcements are needed in the Western Corridor to facilitate more
interconnectors (Statnett 2008:40). The area classified as southern Norway, is identified with a
rather large electricity surplus and the main challenge is bottlenecks in transmission of
electricity to the eastern and western part of Norway (Statnett 2008:38). This entails that some
investments in the transmission grid is necessary without the interconnectors. However, the
planned reinforcements of the Eastern and Western Corridor are well under way, even though
the magnitude of the reinforcements depends on whether or not the interconnectors are
constructed (Statnett 2013a:69–75). 
There has been a reduction of the ambitions in regard to the construction of interconnectors.
Whereas the long-term plan foresaw four interconnectors (NorGer and NordLink to Germany,
NorNed2 to the Netherlands and NSN to Great Britain) (Statnett 2008:33), this was in the
national plan for 2012 reduced to two interconnectors including a postponement of the
commissioning date (Statnett 2011:8). 
As TSO, Statnett is delegated the responsibility of managing trade in electricity and deciding
on bidding areas for electricity. This also entails that Statnett is the actor with the most
updated information on the electricity system. Furthermore, as TSO Statnett also participates
in the European Network for Transmission System Operators for electricity (ENTSO-E).
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ENTSO-E was established as part of the third energy market package in the EU with the aim
of coordinating trade in electricity across borders within the EU (Eurlex 2009:provision 7).
Through ENTSO-E Statnett participates in amongst other developing new regional and
european wide regulation, as well as improving system operation and development projects
such as the ten-year network development plan for Europe and regional investment plans
(ENTSO-E, 2014b, 2014c, 2014d). 
External influence in Statnett
When Statnett was established as public enterprise, it was important to the legislators to
ensure the users of the transmission grid influence in Statnett. This was achieved by amongst
others reserving a seat on the board and the establishment of the “Council of transmission grid
customers” (Innst. 28 S. 1991). This Council had a considerable influence on Statnett, as they
had the right to propose and make recommendations to the board in specific issues, and the
Council chair and vice chair had a right to attend the board meetings (Skjold & Thue
2007:516). The Council has had various representation over the years, however, in the
National budget for 2013 the Government decided to discontinue the Council and the reserved
seat in the board. The Government argued that because Statnett is facing considerable
investments in the coming years, it is important to ensure impartiality of the board, and
organize the users of the transmission grid interests' in a manner that to a greater extent
reflects normal interaction between customers and corporations (MPE 2012:97). 
In the National budget, it is specifically stated that Statnett should facilitate a more ordinary
dialogue with the users of the transmission grid. To facilitate this, Statnett has established
“Market and management forum” that has overtaken some responsibilities of the previous
Council (Statnett 2014c). However, whereas the composition and appointment of the Council
was determined by MPE, through the Enterprise meeting (previous §8 in Statnett 2014b) it is
now entirely up to Statnett's board to appoint members. 
The previous Council had 5 members, all appointed by the MPE through the Enterprise
meeting. Three of the members represented the energy sector, one represented industry, and
the last represented KS who organizes the municipalities of Norway (MPE 2011:3–4). The
Norwegian Consumer Council where represented in the Council up until 2010 when they
chose to withdraw from the Council (Nyhus 2010). The current Forum has nine members,
where six represent the energy sector, two representatives from industry and one
representative from Gassco, a state company responsible for transportation of gas from the
continental shelf to Europe (Statnett 2014c). The main difference in representation is that
there are fewer representatives from organized interests such as EnergyNorway, the
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confederation of energy producers, and more direct representation from companies and
industries. 
5.2.3 The electricity sector and their business associations
The electricity sector consists of a number of grid utilities and energy producers, of variable
size with a very high degree of public ownership. 85 percent of the grid capital is owned by
some form of public entity, divided between the state, counties and municipalities, where the
municipalities has by far the largest share. Only 15 percent of the grid capital is owned by
private investors, then most of it as minority shareholders in grid utilities. Out of the 428
municipalities, 293 has ownership shares in a grid utility (Reiten 2014:21). In addition to this
strong public ownership in the grid utilities, approximately 90 percent of the hydropower
resources are publicly owned (MPE 2013a:18). 
Some grid utilities and electricity producers have participated in the public consultation,
namely Agder Energi, Statkraft, and BKK. Both BKK and Agder Energi are grid utilities and
electricity producers, and they are both located in regions that to some extent are related to the
interconnectors. Agder Energi is the grid utility in southern Norway, which holds an area
concession for electricity grids1, in the same area where the interconnector to Germany is
planned. Agder Energi was one of the initiators in the NorGer project which was later taken
over by Statnett so they may be overtly more interested in these interconnectors than other
grid utilities. BKK holds an area concession for electricity grid in parts of the Hordaland
county, which is the county where the North Connect interconnector is planned. 
Both Agder Energi and BKK are large actors in the energy sector. Agder Energi is the energy
producer with the fourth most installed effect and is the fourth largest owner of the
distribution grid. BKK is the third largest owner of the distribution grid and has the fifth place
in most installed effect (MPE 2013a:19). Statkraft on the other side is different from the
above-mentioned companies. Agder Energi and BKK is owned by the municipalities and
counties they operate in, Statkraft is a public enterprise owned and managed by the Ministry
of Trade and Fisheries. Statkraft is the largest energy producer in Norway and owns 36
percent of the installed effect in Norway (MPE 2013a:19). 
The grid utilities and energy producers has established some business associations that are
active in trying to influence electricity policy. Most notably Energy Norway which is the
biggest business association within the field of renewable energy, representing 270 companies
1 Area concessions are given to the local and regional grid utilities, and there is more latitude to expand and
reinforce the grid with an area concession. For instance, there is no need for concessions from NVE for
energy installations up to 100kV (§3-1 and §3-3 in Energilovforskriften, 2012). 
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involved in production, distribution and trading electricity. These companies represent 99
percent of the annual electricity produced in Norway, and deliver electricity to 91 percent of
Norway's grid customers (EnergiNorge 2014). In addition there is the smaller business
association Defo, which organizes smaller energy producers and grid utilities in the districts
(Defo 2009). NORWEA is another business association working to promote renewable energy
technologies in Norway, with an emphasis on wind-, wave- and tidal energy (NORWEA
2014). 
5.2.4 The business associations, industries and trade unions
The trade unions with their counter parts the business associations constitute the social
partners in society. The social partners are often included in the policy-making process when
new legislation is proposed or new policies developed, as well as represented in governmental
working groups. 
There are four business association that has responded in the public consultation. Of these, the
largest is NHO, which is a confederation of enterprise representing approximately 24 000
enterprises. Membership in NHO is organized through 20 business associations (NHO 2014).
The above-mentioned Energy Norway is a member of NHO. The Federation of Norwegian
Industries, who is the other business association who responded to the public consultation is
also a member of NHO. The Federation of Norwegian Industries is a business association and
they represent a number of different sectors and have 2400 member companies (Norsk
Industri 2014). The remaining business association to respond is IndustriEL is an organization
owned by 24 companies within the energy intensive industries. Energy intensive industries
has long-term agreements for the delivery of electricity, which this organization tries to ensure
(IndustriEL AS 2014). Besides the business associations, one industry has responded to the
public consultation. Norsk Hydro, amongst other an aluminum producer, which is an energy
intensive industry. Interestingly, Norsk Hydro is also an energy producer, and has the second
most installed effect capacity in Norway (MPE 2013a:19). 
There are two trade unions that has responded to the public consultation, the Confederation of
Trade Unions (LO) and one of their members, Industri Energi. LO is the largest confederation
of trade unions in Norway, and in total organizes approximately 800 000 workers.
IndustriEnergi is a trade union, representing workers in the energy and industry sector in
Norway (Industri Energi 2014). 
Some of the aforementioned trade unions and business associations has taken an active stance
in the policy process and public debate regarding interconnectors. Some actors have
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participated in the public debate by publishing reports and common statements. One such
common statement was the “Joint platform for increased value creation”, which was
published in 2011 by LO, Energy Norway and the Federation of Norwegian Industries. In this
platform several political demands are put forward to ensure competitive terms for industry in
Norway, amongst other that economically profitable interconnectors are realized (LO et al.
2011:3). Even though this is not a politically binding document, it shows political intent. 
5.2.5 The civil society organizations
Civil society organizations has a strong position in Norwegian society, and they are important
in development of energy and electricity policy. There are two civil society organizations that
have responded to the public consultation, Bellona and ZERO. They are two of many civil
society organizations that concern themselves with climate and renewable energy policies.
Both organizations has published a number of reports concerning the possibility of Norway
providing balancing power to Germany (see i.e. Lindberg n.d.; Lundeberg et al. 2012). In
addition especially ZERO has been active in promoting the interconnectors in the public
debate (see i.e. Bakken, 2013; Kaski, 2013). Both organizations are influential in the
Norwegian climate debate, however, they have been criticized for their very strong faith in
technology and technological progress as a solution to climate change, as opposed to
traditional nature conservation organizations (see i.e. Hermstad 2013; Swensen 2013; Trædal
2013). 
Other organizations that has previously been involved in the debate around interconnectors is
Friends of the Earth Norway2. In a report, by the Federation of Norwegian Industry in
cooperation with the trade union NITO and Friends of the Earth Norway, possible pathways
for a sustainable future is discussed. The main focus is on efficiency policies, and alternative
uses for the electricity, where interconnectors and increased exports is mentioned as one
possible alternative for the energy saved in the efficiency policies (Naturvernforbundet et al.
2010). 
2 Naturvernforbundet
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6 Empirical evidence: The public consultation and
media coverage
In the analytical framework several explanatory factors where presented to provide an
explanation as to why there has been few participants in the policy making process and little
media coverage. However, before the analysis can commence there is a need to actually
present some empirical evidence of this, which is the purpose of this chapter. In the first
section I present the participants in the public consultation as well as provide some
comparative information from other public consultations. The section continues with a
presentation of the results of the argumentation analysis. In the second section I present an
overview of the media coverage. Firstly, there is a comparison of the media coverage of three
energy issues and secondly a presentation of the media coverage of the interconnectors. 
6.1 Participation in the public consultation
Public consultations is a tool utilized by the Government to get input on proposed legislation,
policy and in this case, infrastructure projects. They are open to all, however that does not
entail that there is an awareness amongst the general population about which issues are
currently being considered by the Government. Furthermore, even if there is an awareness it
does not entail that the public consultation is responded. In the case of the interconnectors, the
public consultation generated 13 responses. This number of responses can be compared to
other public consultations held by MPE. In Appendix 2 I have compiled an overview of
participation in public consultations currently being processed by the MPE. In the compilation
25 public consultations are included, the number of responses ranges from 6 to 65. The mean
response-rate was 23 responses and the median was 15. As such, the 13 responses the public
consultation generated is both less than the mean as well as the median response-rate. 
In comparison, there are public consultations that do generate a lot of responses. In 2014 the
Government sent a proposition on public consultation that would give general practitioners'
the opportunity to reserve themselves against referring patients to abortion clinics. This
proposal generated massive amounts of media attention and criticism, as well as very many
responses to the public consultation. By the deadline 1531 private citizens, municipalities,
organizations and Ministries had responded (Ministry of Health and Care Services 2014). 
In the public consultation in question a total of 13 responses where sent in to MPE. In the
table below I have classified the responses according to their position towards the
interconnectors, or according to their thesis in the language of argumentation analysis. The
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thesis in public consultations is often easily identified, as the responses are written as answers
to particular questions. In addition, the responses are often written rather one-positional, in the
sense that the arguments used support the thesis with the aim of convincing the Government.
However, in this case, some of the responses where not clear cut as can be seen from the table
below. Some organizations either take a very direct stand in support or opposition to the
interconnectors, and these organizations are labeled accordingly. There are some
organizations that states that they in general support interconnectors however they have many
objections to the current project based on the documents provided by Statnett. These
organizations are labeled “skeptic”. And lastly, there is one organization labeled “uncertain”,
because they in their response neither support, oppose or state any position at all. 
Sector Supporters Skeptic Opponents Uncertain
Energy sector Agder Energi
BKK
Statkraft
Trade unions Industri Energi Confederation of Trade
Unions (LO)
Business 
associations
Energy Norway
Confederation of 
Enterprise (NHO)
NORWEA
Federation of 
Norwegian Industries
IndustriEL
Enterprises Norsk Hydro
Civil society 
organizations
Bellona
ZERO
Table 6.1: Overview of responses to the public consultation
From the table it is easy to observe that there is a majority favoring granting Statnett the
licenses. The majority consist of the actors in the energy sector. It is not surprising that
electricity producers such as Agder Energi, BKK and Statkraft supports Statnett's application.
As elaborated on in section 5.1.1 it is more likely that the interconnectors will generate a
producer surplus. Other supporters of the interconnectors are most of the business
associations. Two of the business associations are related to the energy sector and represents
electricity producers, namely Energy Norway and NORWEA. Lastly, the civil society
organizations that has chosen to respond to the public consultation supports the
interconnectors. 
What all these actors has in common is some relation to electricity policy. The civil society
organizations are climate policy organizations, and globally climate gas emissions are closely
related to the production or consumption of electricity. Then there is the electricity producers
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and their business associations, who naturally are interested in the Government's decision on
issues related to electricity policy. Then there is business associations and trade unions
representing the industry and industry themselves. They are naturally concerned about
policies that could affect their competitiveness and by extension the workplaces. In sum, all
who have responded to the public consultation have some sort of interest in what electricity
policy the Government choses to implement. 
However, there are some groups of participants that can be said to be either underrepresented
in the sense that there are few responses or not represented at all. In Norway there is a large
energy-intensive industry, but only one of these have responded to the public consultation. In
addition, there are few trade unions who has responded. The trade union who responded
represent workers in the energy-intensive industries, however there are trade unions
representing workers in the energy sector, for instance the trade union EL og IT. Amongst the
group not represented at all are nature conservation organizations, municipalities and the
consumers. As elaborated on in the previous chapter there is an ongoing conflict between
those perpetrating nature conservatism as an important value in climate change issues and
those emphasizing technological solutions. Friends of the Earth Norway is one organization
that has previously been involved in the issue but has chosen not to respond to the public
consultation. 
The two largest groups that is not represented amongst the responders are the municipalities
and consumer groups. There is a very strong public ownership in the electricity sector, and
289 municipalities has some form of ownership of a grid utility or electricity producers
(Reiten 2014). As such one could expect that some municipalities concerned themselves with
the future income potential of their enterprises, and hence the income potential of the
municipality. Lastly, there are the consumers. It might be too much to expect that there is a
large amount of private citizens that participate in this public consultation, but there are no
responses from consumers groups. One organization that could have involved itself is the
Norwegian Consumer Council which up until 2010 was represented in Statnett's “Council of
transmission grid customers”. 
6.1.1 Argumentation analysis
In this section I will present the most commonly used arguments. An overview can be found
in table 6.2 on page 47. The table reveals that the responses are one-positional, and that the
supporters and skeptical or opponents of the interconnectors rarely mentions the same aspects
of the application. I will in the following present the arguments used by those who are
positive, and then the skeptical and negative arguments and claims. 
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Arguments supporting the interconnectors
The arguments utilized by the proponents of the interconnectors overlaps to a large extent
with the arguments used by Statnett in their application. Statnett's main arguments are that the
interconnectors are needed to ensure security of supply, will lead to increased value creation
in the electricity sector as well as the economic profitability of the interconnectors (Statnett
2013a). The remaining positive argument that is used is that the interconnectors benefit the
climate. This climate benefit is achieved through providing Germany and Great Britain with
clean and renewable balancing power, in addition to enabling Norway to export clean
renewable energy (Bellona 2013; EnergiNorge 2013; NHO 2013; NORWEA 2013; Zero
2013). An aspect of the climate argument is the european perspective, and the need to position
Norway politically so that the interconnectors are part of future plans for the transmission grid
in Germany and Great Britain (Bellona 2013; EnergiNorge 2013; NHO 2013). 
Ambiguous arguments
Some arguments has been classified as ambiguous arguments as they can be used either in
support or in opposition towards the planned interconnectors, depending on the point of view
and framing. For instance the supporters of the interconnectors argues that the interconnectors
are needed to ensure continued value creation in the energy sector. The green certificate
scheme will create a situation of electricity surplus, that needs a reasonable off-take,
otherwise the climate benefits is lost in increased consumption of electricity (BKK 2013:1).
The skeptical or negative responses argues either discounts that there will be an electricity
surplus, or criticizes the underlying assumptions of the electricity surplus. Industri Energi
(2013:1) is one actor who discounts the expected surplus, and argues that they foresee an
increase in consumption from industries. IndustriEL (2013:2) argues that the only question is
not at what price electricity will be exported, but also what alternative uses of this electricity
can be foreseen at these prices. Norsk Hydro on their side points to the insecurities pertaining
to the green certificates in Norway and Sweden, especially where new renewables are
constructed. They argue that expansion of export capacity should be adapted to the actual
expansion of renewables in Norway (Norsk Hydro ASA 2013:2).
The remaining ambiguous argument is the notion of capacity markets. The supporters, to the
degree that this is mentioned, only notes that there are uncertainties regarding whether the
interconnectors will be granted access to the capacity markets (BKK 2013; NHO 2013). The
skeptical and negative responses notes that these capacity markets, that Statnett presupposes
access to, does not currently exist. To the degree that they have been discussed in the EU, it
does not seem that Norway has been invited in (IndustriEL AS 2013; Norsk Hydro ASA 2013).
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Arguments negative or skeptical towards the interconnectors
Table 5.2 reveals that the arguments used by respectively the supporters and the skeptical and
opponents of the interconnectors only to a small degree overlap. However, both groups utilize
Statnett's application and analysis in their argumentation. The negative and skeptical
responses focuses more on the economic aspects and errors and weaknesses in the application.
The economic arguments relates to the distributional consequences of the interconnectors.
This is in economic terms priced as either consumer and producer surpluses. Both Industri
Energi (2013) and IndustriEL (2013) argues that producer surpluses represent a redistribution
of wealth from consumers to producers. 
The application is also criticized based in the expected increase in transmission tariff and the
projected revenue base of the interconnectors. According to industry actors the increase in
transmission tariff threatens the competitiveness of export-oriented and energy-intensive
industries (Industri Energi, 2013; Norsk Industri, 2013). The revenue base is criticized, as
only 40 percent of the income from the NordLink interconnector is generated from bottleneck
income. The rest of the income is calculated to derive from either consumer or producer
surpluses (IndustriEL AS 2014:2; Norsk Hydro ASA 2013:1; Norsk Industri 2013:2–3). The
calculations of the revenue base is also criticized as the revenue base is changing rapidly with
Germany's “Energiewende” and the increase in renewables in Great Britain. This entails that
Statnett's calculations may be wrong and increases the uncertainty about the future income
potential (Industri Energi 2013:3; Statkraft AS 2013:2). 
The last argument is the notion of errors and weaknesses in the application. This argument
encompasses several arguments, out of which the most common critique is the rate of return
used in the application. The rate of return utilized is very low in comparison to projects in the
private sector. Norsk Hydro argues that a higher rate of return should have been used, as
Statnett invests on the consumers bill, and it would then be natural to use a rate of return that
reflect both the preferences of the consumers and the risk of the project (Industri Energi
2013:2; Norsk Hydro ASA 2013:2–3). Another argument in this category is that Statnett
employs a very optimistic time-frame for the projects. Norsk Hydro points this out in relation
to the risk of delays in the projects, and the adverse consequences this entails. One risk of
delay, is that the planned investment decision is foreseen in 2014, however, at this point in
time Statnett will lack a construction concession for some projects. Furthermore, Norsk Hydro
emphasizes that a too hasty pace in the projects may lead to pressures in the supply industry,
hence an upward push of the costs (Norsk Hydro ASA 2013:3). 
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There are several of the respondents who mention investments in the domestic grid. Some,
such as IndustriEl, argues that the need for investments in domestic grid is unsatisfactory
described and the consequences of the interconnectors on the domestic grid not sufficiently
analyzed and evaluated (IndustriEL AS 2013:1). Furthermore, they argue that there seems to
be an underestimation of the costs pertaining to reinforcements of the domestic grid in
relation to the interconnectors (ibid.).
6.2 Media coverage
A central concept in Culpepper's theoretical framework is the notion of issue salience. This is
difficult to measure directly, so in the analytical framework I utilized the same short-cut as
Culpepper, which is to measure issue salience indirectly through media coverage. A
comparison of media coverage of three different energy issues will provide a good indication
as to the level of media coverage of the interconnectors, and establish that there has in fact
been little media coverage of the interconnectors. 
The graph below illustrates the media coverage of the three energy issues: electricity prices,
the transmission grid Sima-Samnanger and interconnectors since January 1st 2000. As stated
in the methodological section, these numbers are most likely overestimated, however, they
show the expected results that fits well with the empirical evidence. For instance, the media
coverage of electricity prices has three clear spikes, in 2003, 2006 and 2010-2011. Based on
the empirical evidence this is not surprising as there was a spike in the electricity price in
2003 because of a dry-year (NOU 2012:18). In 2006 there was an electricity crisis in mid-
Norway as a lot of heavy industries was established but the gas power plants foreseen by
Statnett, MPE and many others were not realized due to uncertainties regarding the
profitability (ibid.:19). This lead to the establishment of a separate bidding area for electricity
in mid-Norway, due to limited transmission capacity to the area. 2010 and 2011 saw
consecutive dry-years, in addition to safety issues with the Swedish nuclear power plants
(NOU 2012:30)
Regarding the construction of the transmission grid from Sima to Samnanger, the media
coverage started the same year Statnett started its planning processes. However it did not
spike until 2010, after the Government rejected the appeal on NVE's decision to grant Statnett
the construction license (Ruud et al. 2011:1). In relation to the interconnectors there has been
little coverage up until 2010, with an increasing coverage as the application process
proceeded, with an increase in numbers up until 2013 when Statnett applied for the necessary
licenses for the interconnectors. 
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The graph is rather revealing concerning the media coverage of interconnectors. The
combined media coverage of the interconnectors is approximately a quarter of the average
coverage of electricity prices, in total 170 articles or newspaper hits from 2010 until 2014. In
all years there was less coverage of the interconnectors than the electricity price. And where
the media coverage of Sima-Samnanger spiked at 492 articles or newspaper hits in 2010, there
is barely any spike to speak of in the media coverage of the interconnectors. There was an
increase in media coverage in 2011-2013 with respectively 35, 39 and 42 articles or
newspaper hits. 
A total of 151 articles where written from 2006 to 2014. In the table below, the media
coverage is broken down by newspaper. The main portion of the media coverage has been in
regional, and business oriented newspapers and one magazine. There are three regional
newspapers that has covered the issue, Stavanger Aftenblad, Bergens Tiende and
Fædrelandsvennen. These newspapers are located in the western and southern region of
Norway. All of these newspapers are located in electricity producing regions, with large
hydropower resources. In addition these newspapers covers regions where the current
interconnectors are planned or, there has been plans to construct interconnectors. Dagens
Næringsliv is the national newspaper with the most extensive coverage. This is also the most
prominent business daily in Norway. In addition there has been some coverage in
Klassekampen, the socialist-left daily, as well as Nationen, the national district daily. 
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Newspaper Share of coverage
Teknisk Ukeblad 25
Stavanger Aftenblad 14
Dagens Næringsliv 11
Bergens Tiende 10
Fædrelandsvennen 9
Klassekampen 7
Nationen 7
Others (each with less than 6%) 17
Total (N=151) 100
Table 6.3: Newspaper coverage of interconnectors from 2006 to 2013.
To summarize, there has been some coverage of the issue of interconnectors. Compared to
other issues the coverage has been very limited. Within the field of electricity policy it is safe
to say that the issue of electricity prices is a high salience issue as it receives abundant media
coverage, as well as enjoys relatively constant coverage. The Sima-Samnager transmission
grid represents the media coverage that a single energy issue might received if placed on the
agenda. Comparing the media coverage of both of these issues with that of the
interconnectors, it is easy to see that there has been marginal media coverage of the
interconnectors as well as only a small increase in coverage in 2013, when the issue was on a
public consultation. In the disaggregation of the media coverage by source, it is visible that it
has been most widely covered by the regional media in the south-western regions, business
newspaper and technical magazine. 
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7 Analysis
The purpose of the analysis is to put the empirical evidence into context and thereby be able
to provide an answer to the research question which is: What may explain the level of
participation in and media coverage of the policy process up to the political decision of
granting or denying Statnett a license to trade in electricity with Germany and Great Britain?
In this chapter I will first analyze participation in the public consultation. The sections that
follows analyzes the explanatory power of the two analytical approaches. First Culpepper's
theory of “quiet politics” and then Baumgartner and Jones' theory of “punctuated
equilibrium”. The chapter concludes with a discussion on what the different perspectives
explains individually and what may be gained in understanding participation by combining
the two perspectives. 
7.1 Participation
The aim of this thesis is to look at what may explain few participants in public policy making.
However, firstly there is a need to establish that there actually has been few participants. By
comparing the number of responders in this consultation to other public consultations by MPE
it is possible to get a fair picture of how many responses is normal. However, what is normal
does not necessarily constitute few or many participants. What is few or many participants in
a given public consultation will depend on the public consultation itself. Public consultations
are democratically important, as it enables all interested and affected parties to provide an
opinion on legislative proposals, policies etc before a final decision is made (Regjeringen,
2006). What is important here is the notion of “interested and affected” parties. Some policies
affect a greater part of the population than others, and some policies are more controversial
than others. Furthermore, some policies have a more direct effect on the population than
others. How controversial an issue is, and the number of affected parties therefore determines
what constitutes few or many responders. 
In a broad sense most of the Norwegian population can be considered “interested and
affected” parties, as the interconnectors will affect the electricity price and security of supply.
As elaborated on in the background chapter, the electricity price is a topic that is a concern
and widely covered by the media. However, it is to a large extent covered when the prices are
high. This gives rise to two contradicting interpretations. One is that electricity prices is an
important topic and decisions contributing to increased prices would in general be unpopular
decisions. If this is the case, one expectation is that at least some citizens or consumer
organization would have responded to the public consultation. 
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On the other side, Statnett argues that the interconnectors will reduce intra-yearly and inter-
yearly variations. By this understanding the expected increase in electricity price might be
deemed appropriate by the population, as the interconnectors would contribute to lower prices
during winter-time and consecutive dry-years. With this understanding of the issue it is not
necessary to expect heavy involvement by the general public. However, both of these
interpretations depends on the notion that there is a general awareness about the issue and that
the issue is widely understood. There is little evidence supporting such a notion. 
Even if the interconnectors do lead to an increase in the electricity price, it might be a stretch
to argue that the general population is affected to such a degree that they should involve
themselves in the issue. The increase in electricity price is quite far into the future and is only
visible on the electricity bill. It is easier to see that issues such as taxes, provision of
healthcare and welfare spending has a more direct effect on every day life and welfare.
However, it could still be expected that some representatives of the general population
responded to the public consultation, such as the Norwegian Consumer Council who was
represented in Statnett's “Council of transmission grid customers” up until 2010. Despite this
previous involvement in electricity policy, the Norwegian Consumer Council chose not to
respond to the public consultation. 
In addition to the general population, there are some sectors with strong interests in the
developments of the electricity sector, namely the electricity sector in itself, as well as the
industry. The electricity sector is interested in these interconnectors as it will influence the
electricity market they compete in. As Statnett stated in their application, the interconnectors
are likely to give a higher producer surplus than a consumer surplus, which entails that the
electricity companies are more likely to increase their revenues. As seen from the presentation
of participation in the previous chapter, of the 13 responses to the public consultation three
where from electricity companies and two from the business associations of the electricity
sector. All of these responses where positive towards the interconnectors. 
The other affected party, the industry has an interest in low electricity prices. There is a large
energy intensive industry in Norway, and the provision of renewable electricity at stable and
low prices is a considerable comparative advantage compared to other countries in Europe
who rely heavily on coal- or gas-fired thermal plants with considerable higher electricity
prices. These industries are interested in keeping the price of electricity low, to ensure their
competitiveness and by extension their businesses. In addition there are the trade unions
representing the workers in the industries, who concern themselves with the competitiveness
of their industries as a means to ensure that their workplaces are not moved to more
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competitive countries. Amongst the responders to the public consultation are industries and
trade unions advocating this view, however, there where some differences in the responses.
Where the trade union was outspoken negative towards the interconnectors, the industry and
their business associations where more cautious either taking a skeptical stance or negative.
The last group of responders are the civil society organizations. There are a plurality of civil
society organizations in Norway interested in energy and environmental policy, but only two
chose to respond to the public consultation, both of which are characterized as technology
optimist climate policy organizations. It is not surprising that ZERO and Bellona chose to
participate, as both of these organizations have been very active in the public debate, as well
as organized conferences and produced reports on the topic. However, they do not represent
the plurality of the civil society organizations. For instance, one voice that is lacking is the
nature conservation organizations, such as Friends of the Earth Norway who has participated
in the debate by amongst other producing a report in cooperation with the trade union NITO
on this topic. 
One group of responders who are lacking entirely is the municipalities and their interest
organization KS. KS was represented in the “Council of transmission grid customers” from
2010 until 2012 when it was discontinued. The municipalities are an important actor in this
debate as 85 percent of the grid capital and 90 percent of the hydropower resources are
publicly owned, i.e. owned by either the state, counties or municipalities. Of the 428
municipalities, 293 has ownership in a grid utility. With this strong public ownership in the
electricity sector by municipalities, it could be expected that there would be some interest
shown by the municipalities in the development of the electricity sector. The interconnectors
will most likely influence the electricity price, thereby influencing the amount of profit the
municipalities can expect. 
So far I have taken the notion of “interested and affected parties” as a starting point for
discussion. In conclusion of this part, the 13 responses to the public consultation represents
actors who falls well within this category of “interested and affected” parties. It can be argued
that there are relatively few responders from all the different actors represented amongst the
responders. But what this discussion has uncovered are several groups of responders who has
chosen not to participate, such as the general population or some form of interest organization
representing their interest. Other groups of non-responders are the municipalities and a more
diverse representation from the civil society organizations, most notably the nature
conservation organizations. As there are so many groups not represented in the public
consultation, I conclude that there have been few responders to the public consultation. 
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If a comparative approach is utilized and the number of responders to the public consultation
is compared to other public consultations by MPE, an easy conclusion can be drawn that the
participation was low. There where 13 responses to the public consultation, which is both
lower that the median and the mean response-rate, respectively 15 and 23 responses, in the
compilation of participation in public consultations held by MPE presented in Appendix 2.
However, this approach does not take into consideration that the issues deliberated and
handled by MPE might be, in general, issues that do not generate a lot of public attention and
responses to public consultations in comparison to other policy fields such as education and
health care. 
7.2 Low salience, participation and media coverage
In the previous section I concluded that there has been few participants in the public
consultation. Now I turn to what may explain the level of participation. In this section I will
first establish that the issue of interconnectors is a technical and complex issue, and then look
at how this has influenced participation and media coverage. 
In the analytical framework I understood 'technical' as pertaining to a particular field or
subject, often related to the applied sciences and something which requires special knowledge
to be understood. I will in the following argue that the electricity system is a technical issue.
The electricity grids is part of a larger entity, namely the electricity system, which consists of
producers, the transmission system and consumers. The electricity system can be viewed as
two-fold, firstly there is the physical infrastructure that has to be in place and secondly the
policies that make it work. The physical infrastructure includes amongst other the production
facilities, the transformers and the electricity grids. An understanding of the capabilities of the
physical infrastructure enhances the chances of understanding what the interconnectors entail.
It requires specialization and study, and usually a degree in higher education such as
engineering to understand the electricity system. That said, it is possible to get a general
understanding of the issues in question without a degree, but it requires effort and studying. 
An understanding of the electricity system is important as it is the foundation to understand
the second part, which is the policies in place and how the interconnectors will influence the
electricity system. The main effect the interconnectors has is that they connect the Norwegian
electricity markets closer together with the British and the German electricity markets. This
again influences how much electricity is produced in Norway and at what prices. With the
interconnectors there is an increase in possible sources for electricity, and the electricity price
in these markets compared to the Norwegian market determines whether there will be export
or import of electricity and hence how much electricity is produced and at what prices. 
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The effect of the interconnectors on the electricity price is uncertain, as there are just to many
uncertain variables to give certain predictions. One important variable is precipitation which
is hugely influential in determining the electricity price in Norway. Other variables are the
speed in which new renewables are constructed in Norway as well as in Germany and Great
Britain. These new renewables are for the most part intermittent renewables, so their output
will be prone to variation. There are many more factors contributing to making the predictions
uncertain, however there are some agreements among the analysis' produced. It is likely that
there will be an increase in the electricity price. This is evident from Statnett's calculations as
the producer surplus is larger than the consumer surplus. However, what mediates this picture
is that it is likely that there will be a downward pressure on electricity prices when the
electricity supply in Norway is strained. This entails that it is likely that during winter-time,
dry-years and consecutive dry-years it is likely that the interconnectors will contribute to
keeping the prices at a lower level than they would have been than without them. 
There is also other elements that indirectly influences the electricity price, or at least people's
perception of the electricity prices. One of them is the projected increase in transmission
tariffs, which is an argument frequently used by the those skeptical towards and the opponents
of the interconnectors (IndustriEL AS 2013:1–2). On top of that the Government has
implemented the green-certificates scheme, which is a subsidy paid for by the consumer to
stimulate to new renewables. One issue that could be discussed here is that the consumers are
subsidizing the production of new renewables for export. This was commented on by the
former Minister of Petroleum and Energy, Ola Borten Moe, who stated that “It is no brilliant
business idea to subsidize Norwegian renewable energy and sell it cheaply abroad” (Salvesen
2012). This is a bit outside the main argument, but it illustrates that one policy cannot be seen
in isolation when it comes to what influences the electricity price. 
How the interconnectors will influence the Norwegian electricity markets and system is
complicated as it demands an interdisciplinary approach. There is the technical knowledge
and predictions as to future electricity consumption and production. This knowledge is
utilized by economists to predict the expected exports and imports. The definition of
“technical” provided in the analytical framework focuses on the mechanical and industrial
sciences. The physical infrastructure of the electricity system falls well within the scope of
this definition. However, the field of economics may not qualify as being technical. A part of
the definition, or description of technical is “requiring special knowledge to be understood”.
Even if the economic analysis' are not technical I argue that it does require some knowledge
of the field to understand them, thereby heightening the barrier to participation. 
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In the analytical framework “complex” was understood as consisting of interrelated parts, not
easily disentangled. From the discussion above it is easy to see the complexity of the issue. As
a basis it is necessary with at least some knowledge about the electricity system to understand
what the issue is about. This forms the ground for an understanding of how the
interconnectors will work with the current electricity system, and how the Norwegian
electricity system will interact with the British and German electricity system. A further
understanding of economics is necessary to evaluate the consequences of the interconnectors
on for instance the electricity price, but also to independently evaluate the robustness of
Statnett's application. An overview of the current electricity policies is also helpful, as the
policies may have diverging goals and influence the profitability of the interconnectors. 
Based on this it is obvious that the issue of interconnectors is both technical and complex. To
fully understand the issue requires knowledge about both the technical components, how these
interact to form the electricity system, as well as knowledge about electricity policies and
economics to evaluate the consequences of the interconnectors. In the analytical framework I
presented a model where the technical and complex nature of an issue has a negative impact
on media coverage. So now that it is established that the issue is both technical and complex,
how does this influence media coverage? 
As elaborated on in the previous chapter there has been little media coverage of the
interconnectors. A total of 170 articles has been written since 2000, and 151 of these since
2006. The average number of articles in a year written about the electricity prices over the
period 2000-2013 was 640, which is approximately four times the combined coverage of the
interconnectors. This leads me to conclude that there has been little media coverage of the
issue and that the issue is a low salient issue. However its connection to electricity prices
should have made it a more high salience issue. As seen from the media coverage of
electricity prices, it is a topic that is continuously covered by the media, with the media
coverage peaking when prices are high. 
As electricity prices are continuously covered by the media I consider it a high salience issue,
at least within the electricity debate. This entails, according to Culpepper (2011:5), that
journalists who cover the issue repeatedly should have some knowledge of the issue as well as
have access to independent experts, which again would have given grounds for an enlightened
debate about electricity prices. With an enlightened debate about electricity prices, a logical
inference is that policies or projects that would influence the electricity price would be
covered by the media. This inference is not supported by the empirical evidence, as can be
seen from the media coverage of the interconnectors. 
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One reason could be that, as Culpepper theorizes, that the issue is technical and complex. A
quick look at the media coverage reveals that the technical weekly “Teknisk Ukeblad” has
written 25 percent of the articles about the interconnectors. It is not surprising that the
technical weekly has chosen to cover an issue that is relevant to the members of the trade
unions who own the magazine. However, it is interesting that the technical weekly has such a
large share of the media coverage, and this supports the argument that the technical and
complex nature of the issue is more easily communicated and understood by readers with
technical backgrounds rather than the general public.
I have concluded that the issue of interconnectors is a low salience issue based on the media
coverage. However, it is not necessarily as easy to draw this conclusion as Culpepper argues.
If we look at the coverage, the majority of articles is either written in the technical weekly, the
national business daily or regional newspapers. In total 33 percent of the articles written
where written by the regional newspapers in the south-western region of Norway. This is the
most relevant region in relation to the interconnectors, as the interconnectors will depart from
two of these regions. There may be several reasons why the regional newspapers has a more
extensive coverage of the interconnectors than the mainstream national media. One is that
some of these interconnectors has also been initiated by the regional grid utilities, such as
NorGer which was initiated by amongst others Agder Energi and North Connect which is
being planned in close cooperation with Lyse Energi (NorthConnect 2013; Rosvold 2010). As
both of these companies are owned by the municipalities in their region, which in turn
provides income to these municipalities. As such, it is not surprising that the regional
newspapers has a vested interest in covering investments that may be made in their region.
The main question is how these two factors, the qualities of the issue and media coverage,
influence participation. In the analytical framework it was theorized that technical and
complex issues would have a negative effect on participation. From the participation in the
public consultation we can at least deduce that the technical components and the complexity
of the issue has not been a positive driver for participation. The respondents to the public
consultation have some form of connection to electricity policies, be it as energy companies,
enterprises, trade unions, business associations or civil society organizations. This previous
involvement entails that they have a previous knowledge of the issue at stake, which lowered
the barrier to participate. The responses to the public consultation shows that these
organizations have the necessary technical competence as well as overview of the electricity
policy field to understand the issue. In the argumentation analysis, I identified the arguments
used by the responders. Most of the arguments utilized are directly related to the
interconnectors and Statnett's proposal. For instance, commonly used arguments were that the
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interconnectors will increase the security of supply, increase the transmission tariffs or
concerns about the revenue base. All responders have utilized arguments that goes directly to
the core of the project, which I would argue shows a good understanding of the issue.  
Other arguments utilized in the responses show overview over the policy field and current
political debates. For instance, most responders referred to the expected surplus of electricity
as a result of the green certificates scheme. Some supported Statnett's notion that there will be
a surplus, others argued that the expected surplus is overestimated. Either way, a firm position
on this issue requires some knowledge about the green certificate policy as well as its
implementation and progress. Other arguments used that also shows a good overview is the
notion of capacity markets and whether or not the interconnectors will be part of a future
capacity market in Germany and Great Britain. 
The only respondent that does not show this kind of insight into the interconnectors is LO,
who where very cautious in their reply and did not take a stance towards the interconnectors.
To some extent it can be debated whether or not LO actually participated or not. Practically,
they participated as they sent a response which is public, however, they did not take a stance
on the issue. But besides LO all responders to the public consultation displays factual
knowledge about the interconnectors in particular and the electricity policy field in general.
Culpepper argues that involvement in low salience policy issues is limited to those who are
already involved. The display of factual knowledge and general overview over the policy field
supports this notion. 
The second factor in Culpepper's analytical framework was media coverage, and that low
media coverage would have a negative effect on participation. As already established, there
has been low media coverage and there are few participants in the public consultation. It is
difficult to say with certainty that the limited media coverage has contributed to the responses
that where sent in. As established above, those who has participated are in general
organizations and actors who are active in the electricity policy field and probably knows
more about interconnectors and its consequences on the Norwegian electricity sector than the
average journalist. As such it can be expected that those who have responded would have
responded even if there was no media coverage of the interconnectors at all. 
On the other side, the limited media coverage may have contributed to limited participation.
There are no outsiders who has chosen to respond to the public consultation, most notably the
general public or its interest organizations, municipalities and nature conservation
organizations. As some of these actors are not very involved in the electricity policy field on a
regular or daily basis, they may not have been aware that Statnett applied for the international
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trading licenses. In 2013 a total of 42 articles where written about interconnectors by 13
different newspapers and averaging at 3 articles per newspaper (see Appendix 2). Even
though this coverage also includes national newspapers, it is not likely that this coverage is
enough to create a general awareness of the issue, thereby being a driver for increased
participation.
The low media coverage of the interconnectors in the media may have been an additional
barrier to participation for those not aware of the interconnectors as well as updated in the
developments in the electricity policy field. In the introduction, the agenda setting effect of
the media is briefly presented. The agenda-setting effect of the media entails that the media's
agenda becomes the reader's agenda both in a positive sense in what the media chooses to
cover as well as in a negative sense by the lack of coverage (see i.e. Jenssen & Aalberg, 2007;
McCombs & Shaw, 1972). The media has the power to set the agenda, as well as frame the
issue at stake, and by not covering the issue it can be deduced from this theory that they may
have had a negative effect on participation. It is impossible to predict what the participation
would have been if the media had put this issue on the agenda, however it can be concluded
that the level of media coverage has not positively influenced the participation in the public
consultation. 
7.2.1 Conclusion
In the introduction I posed the following sub-research question: To what degree is the
technical nature and the complexity of the issue an explanatory factor in determining
participation, through low salience? Culpepper's theory gives a reasonable starting point for
analyzing this issue, and much of the empirical evidence is in line with Culpepper's
assumptions. For instance, the issue is technical and complex, and according to Culpepper's
theory this will most likely then be a low salience issue, which it also is. Both of these factors
will, according to Culpepper, lead to low participation in the policy making process, and then
only by actors already involved in the policy making process. This is also supported by the
empirical evidence. 
However, how much and what does Culpepper's theory actually explain? I would argue that
the theory gives a reasonable and likely explanation as to why there has been so few
participants in the public consultation. By focusing on the qualities of the issue as one factor
determining participation it is possible to infer why some issues have more participants in
policy making than others. The technical and complex qualities of the issue increases the
barrier to participation, as well as limits media coverage. In addition, the limited media
coverage further increased the barrier to participation, as the parts of the population lacking
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previous knowledge of the interconnectors was not informed though the media. The fact that a
quarter of the media coverage of the interconnectors took place in the technical weekly,
despite the potential interest to all consumers, further underscores the difficulties of
communicating technical and complex issues to the general public. 
7.3 Policy monopolies, participation and media coverage
As a starting point for the analysis, it is useful to theorize around what could constitute a
policy monopoly, and then look at the empirical evidence to see whether this theoretical
policy monopoly exists or not. In the analytical framework policy monopolies was
conceptualized as a structure that defined in- and out-groups that limits participation in the
policy-making process. A concretization of the concept 'policy monopoly' was distribution of
authority and access to information. A possible policy monopoly could be a constellation of
electricity producers, grid utilities, their business associations and trade unions. The reason
why these actors might constitute a policy monopoly is that they operate within the same
industry. Additional parts of the theorized policy monopoly could be MPE and NVE, as they
have an authoritative role in determining the rules and regulations.
To qualify as a policy monopoly, the structure has to both limit participation from outsider-
groups as well as limit access to information. From the presentation of the empirical evidence,
Statnett clearly has a central position in the Norwegian electricity system. This central
position is achieved through ownership of the transmission grid. As electricity grids is a
natural monopoly, the dominant ownership position effectively reduces the number of actors
involved. This position is supported by the legal framework designating Statnett as the TSO,
which in addition to their ownership position gives them access to information about the
electricity system. Furthermore, Statnett has the responsibility to develop the transmission
grid and decides on which investments are needed to develop it with satisfactory security of
supply. The national and long-term development plans for the transmission grid represents
agenda-setting powers, and these are developed and adopted by Statnett. 
In long-term and national plans Statnett has determined that there is a need for more
interconnectors, as well as transmission grid reinforcements (eastern and western corridor) to
facilitate the interconnectors (Statnett 2008:40). Through these plans Statnett sets the agenda
for which projects are prioritized and hence the reinforcements of the transmission grid in the
near future. One example is the Eastern and Western Corridor, which is needed to facilitate
the interconnectors as well as improve the transmission capacity between the eastern and
western part of Norway. These projects are already planned, projected and in part construction
has started, even though the scale of reinforcements needed is dependent on whether or not
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the interconnectors are constructed (Statnett 2013:69-75). From this it is evident that Statnett
has agenda-setting powers through the definition of needs in the sector as well as the
definition of the proper solutions. 
Statnett has a central position in the electricity sector through legislation and agenda-setting
powers as a result of the role they have been designated. However, there are also other actors
who might be competitors in being dominant actors in the policy monopoly. An important part
of the concretization of policy monopoly was distribution of authority. The formal authority to
make decisions is with the MPE and the political leadership. MPE has chosen to delegate
much authority to NVE in the electricity sector. For instance NVE has the power to determine
new regulations that falls within the scope of the “Energy Act Regulation”. In addition it is
NVE who has the responsibility to follow up on all laws and regulations and license energy
projects. MPE has in fact delegated so much authority to NVE, that they are not involved in
some decisions unless they are appealed to the MPE. The authority that is retained by the
MPE is the power to grant international trading licenses for electricity and licenses to
construct new large hydroelectric power plants. 
In addition to the distribution of authority, MPE also has agenda-setting powers. Through the
preparation of governmental white-papers and the legislation that follows, MPE sets the
agenda for the electricity sector. It can be debated to what extent this agenda-setting power is
utilized. For instance, in the white-paper on the construction of the electricity grid the
Government chose to not take an active position. It was stated that interconnectors should be
constructed to the extent that they are socioeconomic profitable (Meld. St. 14 2012:52). A
firm position on whether it is a political aim to construct more interconnectors was not taken.
This can be seen as a missed opportunity for agenda-setting, or it can be seen as letting the
electricity sector develop and set the agenda within the legislative boundaries set by MPE. 
To sum up, Statnett has a central and to some extent dominant position within the field of
electricity policy which for a large part is achieved through legislation and the execution of
their mandate. Through the legislative framework Statnett is obliged to develop national plans
for the development of the transmission grid. These plans represent agenda-setters in
electricity policy, where problems are described and solutions are provided. However,
Statnett's central position does not exclude other actors from having central and dominant
positions. MPE and NVE has the formal authority to decide on new legislation as well as the
implementation. Furthermore, MPE and NVE has the decision-making power to decide
whether a project will be granted the necessary licenses, thereby having a final say over which
projects are finalized. An important part of the notion of policy monopolies is the ability of
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the monopoly to limit access to information and access to the decision making process by
others.
If we look at participation in the decision-making process in the MPE, it is clear that the
theorized policy monopoly does not have the power to limit who participates and who does
not. Firstly, there is a legislative framework that ensures that infrastructure projects are sent
on a public consultation. This entails that the information about the project proposal is
available to everybody who feels inclined to investigate the project more thoroughly.
However, as Schattschneider argues, the definition of alternatives is the ultimate form of
power (Schattschneider 1960:68). So even if there are public consultations, the alternatives
are already defined. The option for opponents of the project is to find weaknesses in the
project proposal and make remarks to MPE. As the alternatives are already defined by
Statnett, MPE has the choice between granting or rejecting the application, and only to a
lesser extent to make changes to the proposal. They can also ask for more information or
request that reports are provided that investigates alternatives. However, the argument is that
Statnett, through its position in the electricity sector has managed to both set the agenda and
defined the alternatives to choose between, and in so doing left other alternatives not
considered. On the other hand, it can be said that MPE and the Government chose not to
define alternatives in this matter, and left it to Statnett by not taking a stand in the
Governmental white-paper on grid development (Meld. St. 14 2012).
One of the indicators of a policy monopoly is the promotion of a hegemonic and positive
policy image. In the public consultation there was a majority of the responders who supported
the interconnectors, hence supported Statnett's view that these interconnectors are necessary
to ensure amongst other the security of supply. In the public consultation, the theorized policy
monopoly were very coherent in their responses. They used to a large extent the same
arguments and advocated the same position (see table 6.2, page 47). Furthermore, the rhetoric
applied by both Statnett and those that are positive towards the interconnectors, is a positive
policy image. As stated in the analytical framework, a policy image consists of empirical
information and emotive appeals, and it is the emotive appeals that determines the policy's
tone. The arguments used in support of the interconnectors are that they are beneficial for the
climate, they increase the security of supply and are economically profitable for society. All of
these arguments appeals to established policy objectives, and as such I would argue that they
represent a positive policy image. 
If we turn to the other respondents, it might be argued that the policy image advocated by
Statnett and other energy related actors have penetrated the other respondents. In the public
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consultation there was only one respondent who opposed the project and proposed that the
projected electricity surplus should be utilized in Norway (Industri Energi 2013). The rest of
the skeptical and negative responses by the industries, business associations and trade unions
did only to a small extent question Statnett's arguments on the need for more interconnectors.
Some questioned the notion of the expected surplus of electricity, however the main content
of the responses where critical remarks to how Statnett had designed the projects, revenue
base and cost-sharing. In addition, there was a general concern about the increase in
transmission tariff and the electricity price. But these concerns do not challenge the
underlying assumptions the project is based on such as the need for new interconnectors.
However, it is impossible to say whether this lack of criticizing the underlying assumptions, is
an acceptance of the policy image by the industry actors or if it is a shared understanding of
the status quo. 
The last property of the policy monopoly that Baumgartner and Jones' theory predicts is the
notion of incremental changes within the policy monopoly, and abrupt changes when the issue
is put on the agenda. By the historical account provided in chapter 5, I concluded that the
policy development could be characterized by incrementalism. There was a push to increase
the interconnectedness after the liberalization of the electricity sector in 1990, however, the
sector has since had several projects with a diverging success-rate. The only interconnector
that is operational outside the Nordic region is NorNed. Besides NorNed there are several
projects that has not been realized. Firstly, there are the two interconnectors to Germany that
were granted licenses during the 1990s, where the cooperation was aborted from the German
side. In addition, there was the interconnector to Great Britain that failed to get a trading
license, as the MPE doubted the economic profitability of the project. 
The refusal to granting Statnett the trading license, represents a shift in policy, as MPE
granted relatively many international trading licenses during the 1990s. It also represent a
notion, that Baumgartner and Jones speak relatively little of, and that is the bureaucratic
expertise that is located in MPE. Baumgartner and Jones sometimes treats the bureaucracy as
part of the policy monopoly, and other times as an entity lacking the expertise to challenge the
policy monopoly. I would argue that this last claim is unreasonable, at least when it comes to
electricity policy, which is strictly regulated and with a strong public ownership. Furthermore,
even if MPE does not have the expertise, they have access to the expertise in NVE which is in
charge of implementation of legislation and regulating the sector. 
The main question here is whether or not the policy monopoly exists, and if it exists how it
has influenced media coverage and participation. According to Baumgartner and Jones, the
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existence of a policy monopoly would limit participation from outsider-groups as well as
media coverage. Based on the discussion above it is difficult to conclude that a policy
monopoly exists. One reason why it is difficult to conclude on whether the policy monopoly
exists is the ambiguous role of MPE. I have applied Boasson's (2011) framework in the
delimitation of policy monopoly as a concept, and this framework focuses on distribution of
authority. From the discussion above, it is clear that MPE and NVE has the formal authority
to make decisions within the electricity policy field, and as such should be regarded as part of
the policy monopoly. 
However, they also represent an independent institutional venue as Baumgartner and Jones
calls it. According to Baumgartner and Jones, by shifting the institutional venue, other actors
gets involved in the policy-making process, which represent different interests than those
represented by the policy monopoly. As such they do have the ability to on independent
grounds evaluate the application and its consequences, and as seen from the historical account
MPE denied Statnett's application in 2003 which can be seen as a shift in policy. This unclear
position of MPE and NVE, as either participants in or overseers of the policy monopoly
makes it hard to conclude on the issue. 
Baumgartner and Jones provide several descriptive characteristics of a policy monopoly that
concur with the description of a policy monopoly, however it does not provide conclusive
evidence that the policy monopoly exists. This is for instance the notion of a hegemonic
policy image. According to Baumgartner and Jones, the policy monopoly will promote a
hegemonic policy image with a positive tone. As seen from the argumentation analysis the
theorized policy monopoly uses to a large extent the same arguments and promotes arguments
that can be said to have a positive tone. However, those skeptical or negative towards the
interconnectors are in general not critical towards the description of reality that Statnett
provides. Their position towards the interconnectors is based on what they perceive to be an
application without the satisfactory quality. However, does this lack of critical remarks to the
description of reality represent an acceptance of the hegemonic policy image Statnett is
promoting or just that there is in general a shared understanding of the status quo amongst the
responders? 
In the conceptualization of a policy monopoly, an important notion was the notion that a
policy monopoly would limit participation in the policy-making process by outsider groups.
There is little evidence to support this notion when it comes to electricity policy and the
public consultation. If we look at who actually participated in the public consultation, only a
minority can be said to be part of a theorized policy monopoly. These are Agder Energi, BKK,
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Statkraft, Energy Norway and NORWEA. The other responders are outsider-groups, mostly
connected to the industry and civil society organizations. This may not be a reasonable
argument against the existence of a policy monopoly as this was a public consultation which
was open for anyone to respond to, and complete control over participation in a public
consultation is difficult to achieve. 
As argued in section 7.1 there has been few participants in the public consultation, and there
are several groups not represented amongst the responders. These are the municipalities, the
general population and a variety of civil society organizations, most notably the nature
conservation organizations. According to Baumgartner and Jones' theory these actors has been
excluded from the policy process by the existence of a policy monopoly. This may be
achieved through lack of information. As we have seen there has been little media coverage of
the interconnectors, which has led to little general awareness of the issue. So even though
most records and reports are publicly available, the lack of awareness might be an explanatory
factor as to why so few have taken the time to respond to the public consultation. 
If we look at the policy field in general, there is reason to believe that there are more actors
involved in the policy field than the theorized policy monopoly. The provision of electricity at
comparatively low prices to the industry has been important in the industrialization of
Norway. The electricity price and the developments of the electricity sector is important as it
influences the competitiveness of the industries on the global market. The industry's influence
on electricity grid policy was previously ensured through representation in the “Council of
transmission grid customers” and is currently ensured through representation in Statnett's
“Market and management forum”. Although the current Forum has a majority of
representatives from the electricity sector, the industry is to some extent included in the policy
making in Statnett. 
When it comes to media coverage Baumgartner and Jones' theorized that the existence of a
policy monopoly would have a negative influence on media coverage. The reason is that as
long as the policy monopoly has control over the policy developments, agenda-setting
activities such as increasing media coverage represents an opportunity for other actors to get
involved in the debate and other priorities to be preferred. If this is related to media coverage,
there has been low media coverage. However, there is no empirical evidence that this is a
result of the policy monopoly suppressing efforts to put the issue on the agenda. On the
contrary, there is evidence that the actors and organizations involved in the policy-making
process has tried to put the issue on the agenda, but without success. A majority of the actors
who responded in the public consultation has been active in the public debate and written
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reports. For instance, LO, Energy Norway and the Federation of Norwegian Industries
published the statement “Joint platform for increased value creation”. In addition, the civil
society organizations has published a number of reports on the issue and participated in the
public debate. Despite of these agenda-setting activities, there has been little media coverage
of the issue. 
In conclusion, there is little evidence that the theorized policy monopoly has actively
suppressed media coverage of the interconnectors. In addition, Baumgartner and Jones'
theoretical framework provides little explanation of the poor media coverage in light of the
agenda-setting activities of those that has participated in the public consultation. 
7.3.1 Conclusion
In the introduction I posed the following sub-research question: To what degree is the policy
process dominated by a powerful policy monopoly, thereby limiting participation of outsider-
groups and limiting media coverage? From the empirical evidence presented and the
discussion above it is difficult to conclude that a policy monopoly actually exists. Some of the
descriptive characteristics that Baumgartner and Jones uses to describe a policy monopoly is
present, such as the advocation of a positive policy image and incremental changes. However,
this does not provide definitive proof that there is a policy monopoly. There are two dominant
actors in electricity policy, MPE and NVE on the one side and Statnett on the other. Whereas
Statnett, through its position in the electricity sector, has strong agenda-setting abilities and is
the actor who defines the alternatives, MPE and NVE has the authoritative position within
electricity policy with the power to decide on policy, legislation and regulating the policy
field. 
When it comes to participation it is difficult to see that Statnett and the other energy actors has
the ability to exclude other actors from participating in the debate as Baumgartner and Jones'
theory advocates. There are participants from outside the theorized policy monopoly who has
participated in the public consultation as well as being active in the public debate. However, is
it important that the policy monopoly excludes other actors from the policy-making process?
Statnett has the power to set the agenda, as well as define the alternatives to choose between.
This represents an important power of definition which may not limit participation by
outsider-groups, however it limits the policy-making processes that the outsider-groups can
participate in. 
However, how much and what does Culpepper's theory actually explain? I would argue that
the examination of the structure of the policy field provides an important contribution in
Analysis 67
understanding the policy field, how the agenda is set and the definition of alternatives. When
it comes to participation in the policy making process, it is clear that the structure of the
policy field gives some actors more influence than others, but the establishment of an
exclusive policy monopoly is difficult to substantiate. It seems from the empirical evidence
provided that participation in electricity policy is open to more actors than the theorized
policy monopoly. However, the theory provides some insights into why there are few
participants through access to information. What this theory fails to explain is the media
coverage the interconnectors has had and the agenda-setting activities of the involved actors. 
7.4 Low salience or policy monopoly?
In the previous sections I have debated and concluded on what the two theoretical
perspectives might explain individually. However, can they be seen jointly? And will such a
joint perspective provide a better understanding of the issue in question, namely participation?
In the previous sections we have seen that Culpepper's theory of issue salience, as well as
focusing on the technical and complex qualities of an issue gives a reasonable explanation of
few participants and low media coverage. Those who participated in the policy process have a
vested interest in the outcome. The civil society organizations that participated in the public
consultation aim to change official policy in a direction that mitigates climate change, and
limits future emissions. Industry actors and their trade unions and business associations are
concerned about the competitiveness of their enterprises, which gives them an incentive to be
involved in the policy process. And lastly, the energy sector is interested because the
interconnectors will influence the market they compete in and at what prices electricity will
be sold at in the future, hence their future earnings. 
There are several actors who did not participate in the public consultation, who could have
been expected to participate. This applies mainly to the municipalities, the general population
and a wider variety of civil society. One reason that they did not participate is the technical
and complex nature of the issue it self. It requires an understanding of the physical
infrastructure, economics and knowledge of the electricity policy to make up an educated
opinion on Statnett's application. The low media coverage may also be explained by the
technical and complex nature of the issue. 
On the other side there is Baumgartner and Jones' theory of 'punctuated equilibrium' that
focuses on institutional characteristics to explain participation. As we have seen it is difficult
to conclude that a policy monopoly exists. However, Statnett's dominating role in the
electricity sector provides them with an advantage concerning access to information, agenda-
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setting and the definition of policy. Even though there are actors involved in policy making
that can be viewed as outsider-groups within Baumgartner and Jones' theoretical framework
these are all actors who have a vested interest in electricity policy. 
What this theory provides of explanatory power concerning participation is the notion of
access to information. The groups that did not participate in the public consultation may not
be aware of what is currently being planned by the electricity sector. Late involvement in the
policy process is not a new phenomenon. In the Sima-Samnager case, the public and media
only got involved after the Government rejected the appeal over NVE's decision and finally
granted Statnett the necessary licenses (Ruud et al. 2011). The media coverage that the
interconnectors has received is not sufficient to create a general awareness of the issue. Even
with the awareness of the current plans in the electricity sector it is not guaranteed that
information about the consequences of these plans is understood. The conclusion is that even
if the policy process is open, which is the case with a public consultation, there are actors who
are disadvantaged in participating because they lack a position in the policy subsystem that
provides them with information. 
These two theories provides different explanations of the same phenomenon, though with
different explanatory power. These theories are to some extent overlapping, and by viewing
the theories together one might get a better understanding of the why there has been so few
participants. Culpepper focuses on the technical and complex nature of the issue,
Baumgartner and Jones on the structure of the policy field and the involvement of outsider
groups. However, it could be the case that the technical and complex nature of the an issue
contributes to the establishment of strong policy subsystems which limits participation. 
As we have seen there are two dominant actors within the field of electricity policy, MPE and
NVE on the one side and Statnett on the other. MPE and NVE are not very active participants
in the policy development, which is contrary to the role Statnett occupies as a strong agenda-
setter. Since the issue is technical and complex it follows that participation in the policy
development is limited to those who have time to devote to it and a vested interest in the
outcome. We have seen that those who has participated in the public consultation are actors
who have been active in the policy field for a longer period and has vested interests in the
outcome. 
7.4.1 Conclusion
In the introduction I posed the following research question: What may explain the level of
participation in and media coverage of the policy process up to the political decision of
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granting or denying Statnett a license to trade in electricity with Germany and Great Britain?
What I have provided in this thesis is two explanatory models for answering this research
question. One focusing on the qualitative aspects of the issue as a barrier to participation, and
the other on the structure of the policy field and access to information as a barrier to
participation. I have found that the technical and complex nature of an issue is in itself a
barrier to participation as well as media coverage. However, it might also be an explanatory
factor why strong policy subsystems arise. 
There are a number of groups that have not participated in the public consultation. The
commonality characteristic of this group is that they are not active in the daily electricity
policy debate. They lack the overview of what is currently happening in the sector as well as
the implications of the proposals. I find that a joint explanation provides the most reasonable
explanation as to why strong policy subsystems may emerge and maintain their position. The
structure of the policy field gives much authority to the dominant actors, either as formal
authority or as agenda setters. The technical and complex nature of the issue provides an
additional barrier to participation. These two factors together explain why there are so few
participants. 
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8 Conclusion
In this thesis I have looked at what may explain the level of participation in the policy making
process in an issue of low political salience. My research question was as follows: What may
explain the level of participation in and media coverage of the policy process up to the
political decision of granting or denying Statnett a license to trade in electricity with
Germany and Great Britain? To analyze this research question I have utilized two different
theoretical perspectives, the 'quiet politics' framework developed by Culpepper and the
'punctuated equilibrium' framework developed by Baumgartner and Jones. 
The main empirical finding is that the policy process has in fact been characterized by few
participants and little media coverage. The analytical framework provides differing
explanations as to why there has been few participants and little media coverage. The analysis
shows that Culpepper's theory of 'quiet politics' which focuses on the qualitative aspects of the
issue itself provides a good explanation as to the level of participation in the policy making
process as well as the low media coverage of the interconnectors. I have found that the
interconnectors is a technical and complex issue which is difficult to understand and requires
quite a lot of knowledge from different fields of study to be able to criticize it. This
discourages media coverage and participation from actors who are not already involved in the
issue. 
On the other side Baumgartner and Jones' 'punctuated equilibrium' framework focuses on the
structure of the policy field and how this influences participation. In the analysis of the policy
field it is evident that some actors are provided with more central and dominant position,
especially concerning agenda-setting and the definition of alternatives. However there is little
evidence to support that the structure in itself limits participation, but access to information
provides an explanatory factor to why there are few participants in the policy process. The
participants in the public consultation is for the most part organizations and industries that has
a vested interest in the development of the electricity sector, and participates actively in the
ongoing electricity debate. 
These two theories has independent explanatory power, however they may be viewed as
complementary theories. Whereas Culpepper's theory focuses on the technical and complex
nature of the issue itself as a barrier to participation, Baumgartner and Jones' theory focuses
on the structure of the policy field to explain participation. By combining these two
perspectives it provides an additional explanation as to why there are few participants. The
structure of the policy field, especially the notion of agenda-setting powers may limit
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participation. However, the technical and complex nature of the issue itself can contribute to
segment an exclusive policy subsystem where participation is limited to those who have the
ability to follow and participate in the policy development on a regular basis. 
There are some weaknesses in the analytical framework, especially with Baumgartner and
Jones' theory. This theory was developed based on quantitative data. As this thesis is a
qualitative study some concepts where not sufficiently operationalized to be used with
qualitative data. To be able to apply the theory the concepts had to be decomposed and
operationalized in a suitable manner, which posed several challenges as the concepts became
fuzzy in the process. One such fuzzy concept is the notion of policy monopoly which is so
poorly conceptualized and consists of many interrelated and mostly unquantifiable parts. For
instance, how to separate overlapping interests from a hegemonic policy image? How can a
dominant policy image be measured? What are the criteria that qualifies a policy image as
dominant compared to others? If one manages to identify the policy's tone, how can one be
sure the tone is interpreted in the same manner by the listeners? Politics concerns itself with
the distribution of limited resources, and there will always be disagreements as to the
distribution. 
Maybe the weakest point of Baumgartner and Jones' theory is that it enables circular
reasoning. Circular reasoning is a logical fallacy, where the argument and the proof is actually
the same thing. The circular argument that can be made from Baumgartner and Jones' theory
is that a policy monopoly limits participation by the definition of insider- and outsider-groups.
However, the limited participation is a criteria for the existence of a policy monopoly. It is
impossible to establish a causality, as 'limited participation' is both the explanans and the
explanandum. 
But beside these weaknesses in the analytical framework, both theories used in this thesis has
provided valuable insights into what may explain the level of participation in a policy-making
processes characterized by low salience. These factors are mainly the structure of the policy
field and the technical and complex nature of the issue. It is reasonable to assume that these
factors will be valid explanatory factors in similar cases. 
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Search parameters
I will in this appendix elaborate on the media analysis that has been concluded in this master
thesis. Retriever operates what is termed boolean combinations as well as standard
denotations for searches. Parenthesis indicates search phrases that are to be evaluated
together. Truncations opens up for several endings to the word, and quotation marks indicates
a combination of words that has to appear together. All searches where specified in the
timeframe 01.01.2000 to 30.06.2014. The search was specified to all norwegian printed media
(“norsk papir”). 
Interconnectors: 
Search phrase: (kraftutveksling OR mellomlandsforbindelse OR utenlandskab*) AND
(Tyskland OR England OR Storbritannia)
Sima-Samnager:
Search phrase: (Sima AND Samnanger) AND (kraft* OR monstermast*)
Electricity prices:
Search phrase: (kraftpris* OR strømpris*) AND (Norge OR norske)
Background information
As mentioned in chapter 3, on methodological considerations, Retriever's ATEKST archive
function permits downloads of the relevant statistics and articles. These documents can be
accessed here:
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/lib5j1e8zktk7zc/AACO4fxSqbfKA6w4W4MvoAk7a?dl=0
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Results
Search 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 N
Teknisk Ukeblad 2 3 4 13 11 4 1 38
Stavanger Aftenblad 2 2 1 3 1 4 4 3 1 21
Dagens Næringsliv 4 7 6 17
Bergen Tiende 2 3 4 1 5 15
Fædrelandsvennen 2 7 3 1 13
Klassekampen 1 2 7 1 11
Nationen 1 4 5 10
VG 1 1 3 3 8
Ukeavisen Ledelse 4 4
Nordlys 1 1 1 3
Adresseavisen 1 1 2
Aftenposten 1 1 2
Dagbladet 1 1 2
Dagsavisen 1 1 2
Kommunal rapport 1 1
Dag og Tid 1 1
Vårt Land 1 1
N 3 2 3 11 12 35 39 42 4 151
Table Appendix 1.1: Newspaper articles sorted after year and newspaper (Source: Retriever ATEKST). 
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2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
N
Interconnectors
3
4
1
10
1
3
2
3
11
12
35
39
42
4
170
E
lectricity price
228
390
493
1219
455
421
1388
646
557
446
1093
811
460
348
123
9078
Sim
a-Sam
nanger
1
17
25
13
25
39
492
207
41
21
11
892
Average price of 
electricity
640
640
640
640
640
640
640
640
640
640
640
640
640
640
640
Table A
ppendix 1.2: N
um
ber of new
spaper articles per year per energy issue (Source: R
etriever ATEK
ST)
“Average price of electricity” is calculated based on the years 2000-2013 [(9078-123)/14=639,64 ≈ 640]. 
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List of public consultations by MPE
Public consultation Number of responses
Høring av forslag til endringer i konsesjonsloven 12
23 konsesjonsrunde 35
NVE grunnlagsrapport elsertifikatordningen 30
Nettplan Stor-Oslo 16
TFO 29
420 kV Mongstad-Modalen 15
EUs 3 energimarkedspakke 42
Utredning fjernvarmereg 37
Rådsforordning 347/2013 18
Klage 7
Havvind 63
Direktiv 2012/27 EU 36
Energiloven endringer 55
Troll A 6
Jan Mayen 24
Naturgass 10
Økt utvinning 65
Energimerkedirektivet 10
EU 774/2010 7
Frostpipe 9
Direktiv 2009/548/EC 10
EU/EØS Energi 7
Skanled 8
CCS 14
NordLink og NSN 14
N 579
Table Appendix 2.1: List of responses to public consultations by MPE. 
Average response-rate: 23.16 
Median response-rate: 15
Available at: http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/oed/dok/hoeringer/under_behandling.html?id=2050
Retrieved: July 7th 2014
